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I~ SER~

:JEBP!'.

__;.

RCBERT J. JEBRY & ASSOCIATES

At:orney

~or

P:ainti~~

965 East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Ctah, 34~~,
Telephone:
(801) 262-8915
IN

T~E

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JOHN CALL AND CLARK JENKINS,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
CITY OF WEST JORDAN,

Case No. 19186

Defendant and
Respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants
sought permission
West Jordan.

(hereafter Call) are subdividers.

to sell subdivision

Call

lots in the City of

West Jordan charged a fee of $16,576.00 as a

condition for approval.
The
West

Jordan

authority

for

imposing

Ordinance

City

Plaintiffs

claim

that

Plaintiffs

seek

a

the

refund

33

the

fee

§9-C-8

ordinance
of

the

is

is

found

(Appendix

in
A).

unconstitutional.

$16,576.00

fee.

The

complaint was brought as a class action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The trial court entered Judgment for West Jordan.
Ca~l

seeks

to

Ciave

t'1at

Judgment

reversed,

and

judgment

entered

:...n

:lis

:a'1cr.

certified as a class action.
PFGCEDUiV.;., i1:STOE'i

this

case.

In

the

first

case,

tne

Utan

Supreme

Court

affirmed a judgment of dismissal by the trial court.
Call v.

City of West

Jordan,

1979).

That

attached

the

case

is

Court granted

as

rehearing.

(Call II), 614 P.2d 1257

:::1,

(Call

606

A!Jpendix

Call

''·

!Utah 1980)

2: -

?. 2d

B.

Citv

ICtah

Thereafter,

of

West

Jordar.

That case is attached

as Appendix C.
After

remand,

the

case

During pre-trial proceedings,
master.

The

initial

report

crucial to this case.

was

tried

three

similar

~'

631

Payson

Citv,

Call

899

642

II

of

was

the

special

special master

decided,

Banber:cy
(Utah

P.2d

Dev.

1981)

376

Patterson v. Alpine Citv,
G).

cour':.

is

ver~·

The report is attached as Appendix D.

cases.

P.2d

the

the Court appointed a

Judge Dee entered judgment for West Jordan.
After

to

(Ctah

Call appeals.

this

Court

Corp.

v.

(Appendix

E)

1982),

663 P.2d 95

decided

South

Jordan

Laffertv

(Appendix

(Utah 1983),

Fl;

v.
and

(Appendix

These cases are each attached as exhibits because they

are closely intertwined with this case.
FACTS
A.

Composition of the City of West Jordan
West Jordan is not a '1omogenous

made

up

from

se•1eral

dif:'erent

:crrr.urc1::·.·.

sub-ccr.murc1c::1es.

cs

t:'.;e
:nan~'

·=r1sinal,

ears.

or ol.d-tirners'

::omrnunity i.vhich has existed .for

There are the newcomers'

is a rural farming community.

673,

r.

Tables

1,

There

There is also a business and

light manufacturing community
also

subd::.visions.

Ir.
2,

6i3 at p.5 and p.40,
3,

compare

see

defendant's

Exhibit 1).
B.

Recreation for Old-timers
West Jordan has one central park of fifty acres.

For the most part, that park serves the old-timers.

Ir.

673

at p. 20).
C.

Flood Control for Old-timers
The old-timers utilize an existing flood control

system of canals, ditches and storm sewers.

It appears that

':he old existing flood control system has

long since been

paid off (plaintiff's Exhibit 10).
D.

Growth of West Jordan
West Jordan has been experiencing moderate growth.

The population in 1970 was 6946.

It is estimated that the

population will be 18,000.00 in 1995

(r.

:) .

additional

This

projected

growth

requires

673 at p.4, Table
facilities

for parks and flood control (r. 597-598, 611-626)
E.

Traditional Funding for New Facilities
West Jordan has a variety of resources for funding

the new facilities:
1.

General

Bondins

Power:

million

in

unused

!plaintiff's

Exhibit 7,

::rom ril lan E. Tolman);

The

City

has

$35

bonding

power,

transmittal

letter

2.

J:a~

$2 million

power

'-Jnused

in

see

599

(r.

:cn<:.r'.J . .

~1-.:cC.

::,::r.i.:.:1·~

also

Exhibit 7);
Flood Control Assistance:

3.

per

$110,000.00

for

flood

year

control

The City receives

from

Salt

assistance

Lake

Count1

lplaintif'.''s

Exhibit 10, "Storm Sewer Funding") ;
Storm

4.

Sewer

Fees:

approximately
sewer

West

rece i 'Jes

per year

$219,000.00

(Exhibit

fees

Jordan

in

"Storm

10

storm
Sewer

Funding") .
F.

New Subdivision Fees
In 1974, West Jordan formulated a plan to expand

its flood control system.

This was to be done by building a

series of detention basins

(r. 610-626)

West
sources

for

Instead,

Jordan

di&

not

the detention basins

West

subdividers

Jordan

has

traditional

funding

(see paragraph E above I .

resorted

to

a

Call

622-623).

(r.

use

special

tax

challenges

on
the

constitutionality of that special tax.
POINT I
WEST JORDAN HAD THE BURDEN
OF
PRODUCING
EVIDENCE
In
have

the

traditional

a

traditional

burden
burden

of
was

trial,

the

forward
reversed

in

p:aintif:'
·,;i ':h

tnis

ICa~~J

e'.ridence.

case.

·,JCc,

:~r3a~

.3~

rect~CG~

:~e

~~r

A

~iscoverv

Jordan

c~

producing evidence.

Sanctions

primary

reason

:rustrated

:or

shifting

discovery.

t!"le

Therefore,

reversed the normal burden as a sanction (see R.
also

r.

1460-61,

were three

~here

shift in tne burden:

:~is

The
West

~ur~en

c442,

1444,

~463-66,

1446,

1448,

l-lS0-51,

1468-70, 1472-74)

burden

is

Judge

that

Rigtrup

1171-1173; see
1455-56,

1458,

Judge Rigtrup's pre-trial

order is attached as Appendix H.
Specifically, Judge Rigtrup ruled that:
1.
2.

The trial is hereby bifurcated into two phases.
At the first phase, defendant shall have the
burden of producing evidence.

The trial court reconfirmed Judge Rigtrup's ruling:
The order which was signed by Judge
Rigtrup reverses the usual order of
trial and this Court is bound by that
order that was signed requiring that the
defendants herein proceed as though they
were
plaintiffs
and
put
on
their
evidence as to what they've done with
the funds which were taken from the
developers (September 1, 1982 Transcript
at p. 3 I.
B.

Trust Theorv
West

subdivider
Rather,

Jordan

fee

West

in

Jordan

any

does

not

keep

segregated

simply

lumps

the

or

the

seven

restricted

money

into

its

percent
account.
general

ftrnd.

In the original appeal, Call challenged that practice
of mixing :'unds.

This Court held that:

A~though
the
money
which
was
ccl:ected from the plainti:':'s in this
case was deposited in the City's general

fund, it should r.ot te assumed t:!-'.at c:1e
money thus becomes usab'.e
:er
Jtcer
purposes by the Cic; and is or no
special benefit to the area souqnt to be
subdivided.
On the contrarv .
if
money is collected from t~e ?Ublic for a
specific purpose, it becomes a trust
fund corrunitted to the carrying out cf
that purpose.
606 P.2d at 220
It

is well

settled

that

a

trustee

has

the

duty o:

producing evidence regarding the funds held in the trust.

This

Court has held:
It is the duty of a trustee to keep
full, accurate and orderly records and
when any question arises as to their
sufficiency or accuracy, the burden is
upon him to show the correctness of his
accounts and doubts may be resolved
adversely to him,
Walker v. Walker, 1 ~
Ut.2d 53, 404 P.2d 253 (1965).
C.

Practical Considerations
There are certain practical reasons for shifting the

burden.

The

West Jordan.

financial

records

are

all

in

the

possession of

Call cannot attack those financial records until

they are produced.
This Court

appears

to

have

ah·eady recognized

principle:
As the information that must be used to
assure that subdivision fees are within
the standard of reasonableness is most
accessible to the municipality,
that
body should disclose the basis of its
calculations to whoever challenges the
reasonableness of the subdividers fees.
Banberrv
Development
Corp.
v.
South
Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 904 (Utah,
1981) .

that

POINT II
WEST JORDAN MUST LOSE IF IT
FAILS TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF
PRODUCING EVIDENCE
The

Court

must

find

against

West

Jordan

if

it

is

unable to meet the burden of producing evidence.
This Court has held:
[SJ ome
situations
require
the
party who does not have the burden of
persuasion
to
produce
prima
facie
evidence of the non-existence of such
fact in order to support a finding in
his favor on such issue.
In re Swan, 4
Ut.2d 277, 293 P.2d 682, 686 (1956).
The Court continued:
In other words, the Court must find the
facts against a party who fails to
satisfy his burden and such finding does
not have to be supported by positive
evidence.
Id. at 686
Recently, this Court affirmed that rule.
it

involved

a

bailment

issue,

the

basic

Even though

procedural

rules

governing the burden of producing evidence should be the same.
The Court held that when the burden of producing evidence is
shifted to defendant (as in the present case) and the defendant
offers no evidence, the issue must be resolved in favor of the
plaintiff,

Staheli

Utah, 655 P.2d 680

Farms

v.

Farmers'

Cooperative of

Southern

(Utah 1982).

Speaking of the burden of prpducing evidence, Wigmore
gives the following summary:
He
[the judge] may require the
opponent [defendant in this case] to
produce
evidence,
under
penalty
of
losing the case by direction of the
Judge.
A duty of producing evidence,
under this penalty for default has now
ar-isen ~or the opponent.
9 Wigmore on
Evidence, §2487 p. 294.
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E>::.~e:-'.::·?,

-~

3:3

;__ .3

-

-

-

~

:

~

- .. -

....... '.:l ....
'--

- ~
~

2.

jces

:ie:er.Cant
~1:r

~espect

to step A,

~e

~ever

ge~

POINT

~:I

sat::. s.:

r.ot

tc

Ste~

3.

fAI::,ED
"'.'C
~ORDAN
?RODCCE EV:DENCE THAT A ?~E::c
HEARING WAS HE::,D AND THA"'.' THE
?:..AN~::;c

·=::::~_'-11.SS.::G~

':'EE C,RDI:JANCE

PREP.:..RE::

~3~--~ues~1cn

1:-':

:.~e

ar.sw·e:-e:...:

3::::::-7nat:··e.
':.J.x::--.c

;-c:·...·e:::_-.

_L

---~.:i._:

':e~_.:;

s:3:~:~s

~ee~s

~:3:~

:::-:-··e:r::~.e:-.:

=·~~=-a

::-:cse

:.-:.e

:~a1.-:.

stat~te

:...s

::i:-::::.<.:er.

ar.c

!n ':his ·:hain 2f

:.!"'.e

3':.

3:~

:~a:.

.:_?.

st2':.'....:.tes

ar:-e

:::ielega+:.:.cn

~e:egation

··:e~e~

~~;-~~

sa":::..s::.ed.
:.s

::--.e

·:s:.:.

:ast

states:

The Plar.ninq Commission shall oreoare a
regulation ~overning t~e subdi~:.sion a~
land '"'ithin a munic::.pality.
.:.. p•.:blic
hearing thereon shall be held by tne
legislative
body,
after
which
the
legislative
body
may
adopt
said
regulation
for
the
muni~ipality,
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-25 11953.
After

the

decision

in

Cal~

I,

Call

amended

the

complaint to include the following allegation:
Plaintiffs allege
that Ordinance
No. 33 was not prepared by the '.-iest
Jordan City Planning Commission and
that no pubiic hearing was held on
Ordinance 33 prior to its adoption,
as required bv the aforement::.oned
statute, and that Ordinance ~o. 33
is therefore •101d and invalid, Ir.
339 I .

~".

Thus,
~a~

the issue in Call I was whether the

ce.eqated oower to

~ou~t

~eJd

the de:endant to impcse

tnat taxing power was delegated

:a::

now

cla1~s

':.-:.at

tne

fee.

a pub:ic

Commissior.

c!".e

3nC

i~

the

:eg::.s!at~re

.-:.ear:-:~g

?repared

crd~~ance

:3

the

:~·.·al:d

B.

There is No Evidence o: .~.n·.·
and
No
Evidence
That
the
Prepared
bv
the
Plannina
Commission.

a.r.d

-·C~. .:._;;,:;

There is no evidence in the recorJ of 3ny
hearing

on

the

issue

of

the

seven

percent

~ucl::

suodi•Iider

There is no evidence in the record that the Planning and

:'ee.
Zoni~c

Commission prepared the ordinance.
After West

Jordan

completed

its

evidence

Jwdge

Dee clearly agreed that there was never any public hearing; and
that

there

was

never

any

action

by

the

Planning

and

Zoninc

Commission:
. no
evidence
was
specifically
given to the Court during this hearing
concerning
the
preparation
of
the
ordinance by or under the direction of
the Zoning and Planning or Planning and
Zoning Commission,
and there was
no
evidence given to the Court during this
hearing about a public hearing, (Sept.
2, 1982 Transcript, at p. 72).
West

Jordan

will

likely

rely
(R.

signed by Judge Dee some months later.
However,

on

the

findings

1500 paragraph 221

those "canned" findings were prepared by West Jordan,

and mechanically signed by Judge Dee some months after hearing
the

evidence.

United

That

States,

503

practice
F.2d

1291

has

been

(10th Cir.

Corp. v. United States, 514 F.2d 935
Nevertheless,
Judge Dee signed those
evidence

in

hearing.

Neither

the

is

to

there

G.M.

19741

(10th Cir.

Kelson

•1.

Leas1nc

19751.

it makes little difference whetr.c·

"canned"

record

criticized:

findings.

support
any

a

evidence

There

finding
tc

is
of

surpcc::

that the Planning Commission prepared tl".e ord::oar.ce.
'. 0

s1mpL

,.....

a
a

pu~

:'

ind1~:

The
Failure
to
Statutorv
Step
Ordinance Invalid.

Follow
Renders

Each
the

West Jordan can impose a fee if the Planning and
Zoning
hearing

Commission
is

held.

prepares

the

However,

West

statutory procedures.

ordinance,

and

if

Jordan

not

follow

did

That failure is fatal.

Unlike the usual legislative hearing,
the public hearing on a proposed zoning
ordinance or amendment is required by
law.
A notice of hearing to a property
owner may be required by the due process
clauses
of
the
state
and
federal
constitutions .
. Failure
of
the
legislative
body
to
conduct
an
appropriate hearing, after notice which
affords a fair opportunity to be heard,
will
render the
regulation
invalid,
R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning 2d,
(1976), Section 4.11.

***
Municipal
corporations
have
no
inherent power of taxation.
On the
contrary, municipal corporations possess
with respect to taxation only such po.wer
as has been granted to them by the
cons ti tut ion or the statutes .
. It
has been frequently stated that, as the
power to tax is a governmental function,
exercise
thereof
by
a
municipal
corporation
must
rest
upon
a
constitutional or statutory grant of
power
clearly
expressed .
And
since the authority to levy taxes is an
extraordinary one, it should never be
left to implication unless it be a
necessary implication.
The grant relied
on should be evident and unmistakable,
and, if there is a doubt as to the
existence of the power, such doubt will
be resolved against the municipality and
in favor of the taxpayer. McQuillin, The
Law of Municipal Corporations, Section

***

public
those

The ordinance is

invalid.

44.0':.

a

The grant of

by the state to a

will be,

an~· pcwer
~unicipal

according

to

t::.e

tc

~3:(,

~a·~~

ccrocra:i

r'_:

,

s.c::::ep~--:0 1:.

~c

by virtually all aut'1oritcies, ccnstr'Jec
strictly.
A citizen cannot be sub'ected
to the burden of taxation wit'1cut-cl~ar
warrant of law.
The
power
of
taxation
,_:an
be
exercised only in the manner prescribed
by
law.
If
the
authority
of
the
municipality to tax is doubtful, the
doubt must always be resolved against
the tax.
Id. at Section 44.13.
Utah
Gwilliam v.

case

law

Ogden City,

is

in

accord.

49 Utah

555,

A case

164 P.

in

1022

po1-nt

is

119:7) . • r.

that case, the legislature delegated power to tax for municipa:
improvements.

The

notice

days

twenty

published
However,
gutter.
allege

a

notice

the

city

statute

required

prior
to
did

to

levy
more

the

imposing
taxes

than

for

city
the
a

simply

to

publish

tax.
curb

The
and

install

a

city

gutter.
curb

and

The city lowered the grade of the street.
that

the

tax

was

The

illegal.

Utah

Supreme

Court

concluded that:
The things required of the city
by [the statute] are jurisdictional, and
unless
they
are
complied with with
reasonable
strictness
the
city
authorities
are
without
power
or
jurisdiction
to
impose
a
special
assessment or tax to defray the cost of
the proposed improvement,
16 4 P.
at
1024.
Gwilliam is a vintage case.
changed.
Lewis v.

However, the law has r.c:

More recently, our Supreme Court deciced
Kanab Citv,

523 P.2d 4:·

Kanab desired to raise money

~or

a

ICtah
c~rb

c9.41.

and

;ut~er

c~e

::--.

case

:.:-:at

case

;r~-ec~.

~~e

legislature had delegated power to

tax for such improvements.

~unicipalities

to levy a

However, that statute required the

city to follow certain specific steps before assessing the tax.
One step required a board of equalization and review.
step

required

that

notice

be

mailed

to

Another

each property owner.

Kanab City failed to follow those procedural steps.

The Court

held that Kanab City had no power to tax unless each of
procedural

steps

was

followed.

The

tax

was

the

therefore

invalidated.
The

final

chapter

on

this

issue

was

written

just

months ago in the case of Patterson v. Alpine City, 663 P.2d 95
(Utah 19 8 3) .
Patterson,

the

Patterson is almost identical to this case.
municipality had assessed certain sewer

In

fees.

Power to impose those fees was delegated from the State for use
only where an ordinance was passed by roll call vote.

Alpine

City did not follow that statutory procedure and the sewer tax
was therefore invalidated.
D.

This Case Does Not Fall Under the
Broad Powers Granted in State v.
Hutchinson.
In

a

landmark

decision,

dramatically expanded municipal powers.
624 P.2d 1116
check

for

(Ut.

1980).

municipalities.

this

State v.

Court

has

Hutchinson,

However, Hutchinson was not a blank
The

Hutchinson

Court

held that:
Specific grants of authority may serve
to limit the means available under the
general
welfare
clause,
for
some
on
the
~imitation
may
be
imposed
exercise of power by directing the use
power
in
a
particular
manner.
r~4 i'.:d at 1126

specifically

impose

subdivider

restrictions.
are.

One

restriction

fees.

We

learn

That

from

power

Call

;ranted

i,;;
~

restriction

is

a

is action by

the

Planning

what

public

·,..;1+:.h

those

::estr1ct18r.o

nearing.
and

~t--e,_·1::.

A

secor:c

Zoning Commission.

Since West Jordan enacted the ordinance without following
rules,

the

the delegation of authority fails and the ordinance is

invalid.
POINT IV
WEST
MEET
THAT
IS
A.

JORDAN HAS FAILED TO
ITS BURDEN OF SHOWING
THE SEVEN PERCENT FEE
A RESTRICTED FUND

Statement of the Issue.
Defendant

has

no

power

to

impose

a

fee

on

subdividers as a general revenue measure .
. A reasonable
charge
for
a
specific purpose is permissible, whereas
a general fee that amounts to a revenue
measure is not.
Lafferty v.
Payson
City, 642 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah 1982)
West Jordan's City Ordinance specifies that the seven
percent fee will be used for flood control and parks.
key

issue

is whether

control and parks,

the

fee

or whether

is

really

used

only

Thus, a

for

it is used for general

flood

revenue

measures.
This

same

issue was preserved

in Cal 1 I,

Court stated:
I f money is collected :rom
public
purpose,
for
a
specific
becomes a trust fund for carrying
that purpose.
606 P.2d at 220.

the

lt

out

where tne

The issue

~as

also

~ramed

in the pre-trial order:

. defendant shall have the burden
of producing e•1idence on the following
issues .
D.
Whether
the
seven
percent
subdivision fee was in practice used as
a
reasonable
charge
for a specific
purpose, or whether it was in practice
used as a general fee that amounts to a
revenue measure.
(R. 1030-1031)
B.

Judge Dee's Findings
Judge Dee made the following finding:
Even though the individual dollars paid
by the plaintiffs cannot be individually
traced through the accounting records,
the Court finds from a preponderance of
the evidence that the monies were spent
on flood control projects and parks and
recreation areas for which the impact
fee was assessed
(R. 1498)

C.

Survey of the Evidence
This

is

not

conflict or where the

a

matter

where

the

evidence

judge had to weigh evidence.

is

in

There is

not one iota of evidence to support Judge Dee's finding on this
crucial issue.
Plaintiff's expert has testified that defendant did
not

segregate

the

funds

or

treat

them

as

a

trust

fund.

Plaintiff's expert has testified that West Jordan's records do
not show how the money was used,

(Nov. 18 Transcript, at 11-13

and 16-17).

The

special

master

agrees with

plaintiff's

expert.

The special master has concluded that the defendant's records
do not account for these trust funds properly:

15

accou:-i.<:.:.ng

':.:-e3.+::_,...e!~':..

: :...r-st,

:::-:::.:: ..:. .

st-'.ccJ: ::! :-:a'»= ~.:>=pa:-e,..;. 3
-:eC
asset ledaer :.~at recorjed 3 iescr1ot:.2~
of al~ :{xed assets ;:ur::r.ased, jate _,~
the

Cit:.:

purchase,

cost and 3r.y other app

information

.3ecor.C:~·,

I

~icab~e

<:.::-iin:~

that

the Flood Control and ParKs Fee receipts
should have been recorded directl~ into
a restricted equity account with~n the
general
fund,
which
wculd
represent
earmarked funds for :~ood contro.i. and
parks.
As the City deterrnined alccwable
uses for these funds, t:'1ey should ha\·e
made a transfer
from the restricted
equity account to the revenue account,
!plaintiff's Exhibit 9 at p. 91 ./
West
However,

Jordan

those

did

accounting

introduce
records

its

simply

accounting
do

not

records.

answer

the

question of where or how the seven percent subdivision fee was
spent.

The~

testimony on that issue is as :ollows:

Q.
(By Mr. DeBry I
Okay, based upon
all the exhibits you've seen at trial,
based upon generally accepted accounting
principles, based upon all the testimony
you've heard at tr ia 1, do you have an
opinion whether the plaintiffs'~>; fee
was spent on any flood control or any
park project?

A.

I

can't form an opinion.

Q.

Why not?

A.
Because as I stated before, there's
no issue that they built these pro:ects,
the issue is I don't /.(now 'Nr.cse ~.oney

was spent.
The :t:und :.s self-oalar.c1ng,
yes, but I don•t ~new ~hether ~e s~ent a
particular sum on t:--,e :-1a\'Or s .:ar, -. _. _
whether '..;e spent
on this ~rc:e·:':,
(Nov. 13 :':::-anscr:.-;::t, at i_:. ~6-_-l
1

.J..1.-.

/.

.:J.m

a c_"L..i:m :1fJ ~ lu .1.tu..1 d ~c-0 a_
~ ~"-'d a.cup:t L{h c 1n1..tle1 _,_

Qn

CVt1

~r i

)

1ct . .u,,.J_w~

~lui1._f" ,L '>'l..P'-V~
.

~Li 53(e)fz_' L'."fi:

C.P.

~J,1.,,..

i __.,,

,f.U «.~

1

;...1._ •1·~· \1·-(J

:.. s

t:o

':'o accompl.:.sh Step 3,

:::!eter;Tune

, .:

ar.·:

c:npossib~e

any

ar.a ~ys l.S

I would have

general

defendant

obligation for benefit to subdiv.:.ders
existed for each flood control and park
transaction and proiect.
Since this
information
is
not
orovided
in
the
existing accounting records,
it will
have to come from other records and,
again,
from
the
help of
a
trained
engineer.
It is also oossible that such
information mav not be available at al~
for some transactions, therefore, the
analysis
would
not
be
possible
[Emphasis
added. I
!plaintiff's
Exhibit 9 at p. 7).
D.

Sumrnarv
West Jordan had the burden of producing evidence to

show that the seven percent fee was used for Flood Control and
Parks.

West Jordan did not meet

that burden.

Two qualified

C.P.A.s

ICall's expert and the special master)

testified that

they cannot determine where or how the money was spent.
expenditures were not restricted,

they amount to more general

revenue measures.
POINT V
WEST JORDAN HAS
FAILED
TO MEET
ITS
BURDEN OF SHOWING
THAT
A
FLAT
SEVEN
PERCENT
FEE
IS
APPROPRIATE FOR ALL SUBDIVISIONS
A.

Statement of the Issue
This Court has stated that:
The dedication [or fee] should have some
reasonable
relationship
to
the
need
created by the subdivision.

,-,

/.

~·) {r)fz) L;.R

If the

er.:>, Wlcl o.t

. if

not,

it

is

:urb1dde:-:

:i.~c

amounts
to
confiscation
c: pri«·ate
property
in
contravention
af
=he
constitutional prohibitions r-ather than
a reasonable regulation under police
power,
Banberry Development Corp. v.
South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 905.
The Supreme Court has also noted that some types

c~

improvements are city wide:
The central
facilities
that
support
water and sewer service would generally
confer the same benefits in every part
of the community
. Id. at 905.
However, other types of improvements are

spread cut

and vary from neighborhood to neighborhood:
. The
benefits
conferred
by
recreational, flood control, or other
dispersed resources may be measurably
different in different parts of the
community.
Id. at 905.
Of
projects

course,

(flood

measurably

this

control

different

and

case

involves

parks)

in

different

was

clearly

neighborhood-type

These
parts

of

proJects
the

"may be

community."

Id. at 905.
This

issue

preserved

in

the

pre-trial

order:
At the first phase, defendant shall have
the
burden
of
producing
evidence .
. The
accounting
should,
inter alia, specify how defendant has
spent the 7% subdivision fees paid by
plaintiffs.
The accounting shall also
compare how defendant has spent the ~%
fee
received
from
[all
other!
subdivisions .
(R. 1030)
It appears that this issue is especiall1 =rucial in

'"'!'1t

'.lf

ttns

C'.lurt' s

~·

~6:i

P.2d

95

t:-iat

a

and

S l, 5 0 0. 0 0
Just

for

the

charge

in

arbitrarily

A

residents

$1,000.00

same

city-wide water

opposite

side

of

residents

neighborhood

of

projects

that
the

when

City

some

and

It

a

residents

other

residents

is

seven

Alpine

some

system.

coin.

v.

this Court held

assess

the

all

Patterson

In Patterson,

oo+ ( Q~)

can

other

ruling

19831.

ll~tah

municipality

$700.00

recent

This

case

is

unreasonable
percent

neighborhoods

fee

require

to
for

flood

control projects and some do not.
B.

Judge Dee's Ruling
Judge

issue,

Ir.

Dee

1496,

additional findings
the motion
C.

(r.

made

at

all

on

this

crucial

Call made a timely motion to make
Dee denied

JuQ.~e

1494).

Survey of the Evidence

evidence

suggests

needs

in

various

shows

a

across

variety
the

proJect.

evidence

substantial
parts
of

city.

of

Costs

vary

differences
city.
flood

to

pay

Nevertheless,
in

flood

Defendant's
control

substantially

costs

subdivisions which use

obligated

skimpy.

from

only

of

the

to

On

the

defendant's

it would appear that the Barney's Creek

19

spread

Storm Drain

Exhibit 4. I
Thus,

7

into Barney's

3200 West
(See

control

project

$275,703.04.

$38,313.86.

the

Exhibit

projects

subdivisions which drain

saddled with capital

hand,

is

the

different

For example,

Creek are

are

finding

(R 1256 at paragraph 3).

Defendant's

other

no

et seq.).

subdivisions
3200 West

would

have

a

subdivisions.

much

n1cher

However,

t:',at

assesHrent
c.ct

is

':'1e

city has charged a

flat seven percent co all new

Obviously,

subdivisions

some

are

•c··

~nan

:3s-=.

suod1~is1ons

overpay1ng--others

3.r~

underpaying.
For
Exhibit 7)

example:

notes

that

seven percent fee.
for

that

(See

year

to

would

$177, 000. 00

would

be

the

Barney's

Exhibit 10

Therefore,

contribute

budget

1981

(see

be

plaintiff's

recei•1ed

from

t~.e

The budget shows that the major expenditure

plaintiff's

Funding.)

the

the

in

Barney's

Creek

section

Detention

titled

1981,

all

new

Creek

project,

Basin.

Sewer

Storm

subdividers
even

though

must
their

subdivision might be in a wholly different part of town.
D.

Summary.
In summary, the city is only authorized to irr.pose the

fee

for

However,

specific

the city has

subdivisions

in

between that

flat

for

any

Patterson,
seven

needs

is

flat

of

and

tax of

town.
tax

really

(compare Point III above)

used

and

as

a

is

any

That

supra.

subdivisions.

seven percent on all

There

subdivision.
Banberry,

specific

by

seven percent

specific

percent

set a

all parts

supra

caused

no

relationsh1?

specific

squarely
It

general

appears
revenue

proJeC~

violates
that

the

measure,

?OINT 'JI
DEFEt!Di'.NT
HAS
F .0..ILED TO MEET
I'I'S
5CRDE:l ".:C
SHOW
THAT
'::HE
SEVEN
PERCENT
FEE
FALLS
EQUALLY
ON
OLD-".:1:1.ERS,
cJEW-COMERS,
AND
FUTURE-COMERS

A.

Statement of the Issue
This Court has stated that it is unconstitutional to

put the entire burden of
the

purpose

financial

of

the

burdens

improvements on newcomers.

seven
among

percent

fee

old-timers,

is

to

Rather,

equalize

newcomers,

the
and

future-comers.
Stated otherwise, to comply with the
standard
of
reasonableness,
a
municipality fee related to services
like water and sewer must not require
newly developed properties to bear more
than
their
equitable
share
of
the
capital costs in relation to benefits
conferred.
To determine the equitable
share of the capital costs to be borne
by
newly
developed
properties,
a
municipality
should
determine
the
relative burdens previously borne by
those properties
in comparison with
other properties in the municipality as
a whole: The fee in question should not
exceed the amount sufficient to equalize
the relative burdens of newly developed
and other properties.
Banberry,
631
P.2d at 903.
The Banberry court went on to suggest seven criteria
which would equalize the burden among old-timers, newcomers and
future-comers.

631 P.2d at p. 904.

::' 1

B.

Judge Dee's Findings
Judge

burden

on

simply

paragraph

However,

parroted
29).

paragraph 14).
C.

rrade

old-timers,

equalized.
He

Qee

spec:;,.::::

:1r,di;)cs

newcomers

Judge

the

Dee

qave

language

Call made a

and

:.--:e

::~a!:

,-._,

futu~e-co~ers

:-ic

a.0al'/s1s

from

Banberry.

~3d

:.:-ie

o:

~+-,

IR.

timely motion to amend.

~e~-

issue.

1502

: 2 54

( R.

The motion was denied by Judge Dee.

(R.

a•

l4941.

Survey of the Evidence
This is not a case where the trial Judge had to

evidence.

There

was

absolutely

no

evidence

to

we1g~

suppor~

Judge Dee's finding.
Indeed,
that

the

defendant's

old-timers

percent subdividers

are

getting

fee was

According

to

that

~

a

evidence
"free

shows

ride."

apparently based on

a

clearl,.

The

sever.

i9-4

Study

That study bases the entire ccst

(defendant's Exhibit 7).
the improvements on

skimpy

subdivisions

study,

the

old

(Exhibit

portions

7

of

at p.
the

absolutely nothing toward the flood control proJects.

o:

ll-i21.
City

pa:

That is

a direct violation of the Banberry rule.
The only evidence on this issue came from plaintiffs'
expert.
relate

Plaintiffs' expert testified that it is impossible tc
the

contributions

of

newcomers,

old-timers,

ar.c

future-comers based upon the evidence and records produced be
West Jordan,

(Nov.

18,

1982 Transcript at ?·

13-16)

POINT VII
THIS CASE HAS ~JOTHING ".'C er
WITH THE NEED FOR FLOCD
CONTROL AND PARKS
Most of defendant s
1

e':1de~ce

~e:3~e~

:cnt=cl anc parks.

~:ccd

Ca.i.l

concedes

Cal: concedes that West Jordan needs

t'1at

West

Jordar.

needs

flood

control.

However, tnat nas absolutely nothing to do with this case.
This case deals with how to finance the flood control
and

park

bonding.

proJects.

One

way

to

such

prOJects

is

(see plaintiff's Exhibit 7 at

However, West Jordan has chosen another scheme.

9 4) •

by

Of course, the financial burden of bonding would fall

equally on all 26,000 residents
p.

finance

West

Jordan has chosen to finance the proJects on the shoulders of
approximately 100 subdividers.
Thus,
has

the issue in this case is whether West Jordan

constitutional

and

statutory

authority

to

shift

that

financial burden from a base of 26,000 people to a base of only
100 people.
Finally, there is a "red herring" in this case.
Jordan pleads poverty.
"bend"

the

West

West Jordan really wants this Court to

rules because of the alleged populatiqn explosion

and financial need.
In

point

of

fact,

West

Jordan's

revenue

from

all

sources has grown over one thousand percent (1000%) in the past
decade,

(plaintiff's

defendant

could

raise

Exhibit
an

7

at

p.

additional

(see

Manager,

attached with plaintiff's Exhibit

defendant

flood control.
per 1ear in

can

probably

~oreover,

~lood

letter

bond

from

$35

tomorrow

the

transmittal

85.).

up

to

million

Allan

$2

Indeed,

G.

7).

in

the
bonds

Tolman,

City

In addition,

million extra

for

the defendant gets about $110,000.00

control funds from the Salt Lake County

23

government.

Final~y 1

per

5219,000.00

year

in

se·Nec

sc0cc-

:ncnt:~l 0 ·

0

plaintiff's Exhibit 10, section titled Storm Sewer
In

City

is

summary,

poor.

direction.

All

The

there

the

is

no

cb~ecti\le

evidence

increased

in

means

an

''°~··

?und1~c.1

tha"t

e•,~1dence

points

population

cc.o.

the

':.~e

opposite

increased

tax

base for municipalities.
POINT VIII
THIS CASE SHOULD BE CERTIFIED
AS A CLASS ACTION
A.

Procedural History in the Trial Court

This case was brought as a class action.
certify the class was made
denied,

(r. 127).

the class was
denied.

(r.

(r.

to

Judge Winder.

renewed

to

Judge

Banks.

That motion was

also

before

Dee,

463).
motion

was

renewed

908-914).

Judge

Dee's

final

certification,

ruling

denied

class

Procedural History in the Supreme Court
class

issue

was

presented

Supreme Court during the briefing on Call I.
was silent on class issues.
certification.

intermediate

Judge

(r. 1507-1508 at paragraph 17).

The

class

The l'lotion was

Some three years later the motion to certify

The

B.

A motion tc

appeal.

Ca 11
The

After remand,
pet1 tioned
petition

the

was

to

the

utan

The Supreme

Cour~

Judge Banks deniec
Supreme

denied.

Court

Thereaf~e1,

Call petitioned to the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus
compel Judge Banks to enter findings.

fer

~-

tne c~ass issue has been to the Supreme Court on

~hus,

occasions.

-:.r::reo::::>

i-lowe•;e r,

tt'.e Supreme Court has net ruled on

the class issues.
It
leaves

is

settled

the matter open

court.

for

that

further

Walsh v. City of Detroit,

Blinzler

v.

Andrews,

519

P.2d

Heins of Haeu, 556 P.2d 920

c.

silence

on

an

issue

consideration by the

trial

412 F.2d 226
438

(Ida.

(6th Cir.

1973);

l969);

Hulihee

v.

(Hawaii 1976).

Rule
23(a) (1)--The
Class
is
Numerous
that
Joinder
of
Members is Impractical.
The

such

class

this

in

case

so

all

consists

of

all

subdividers who have been required to pay cash and/or property
pursuant to Ordinance No.
Amendment
that

the

members.

thereto
class

33 of the City of West Jordan and the

adding

consists

Joinder of

Section 9-C-8.
of

all

Plaintiffs

approximately

100 would be

one

believe

hundred

( 100)

impractical because of

size alone.
Even
members,

if

Rule 23(a)(l),

the

class

Utah R.

Civ.

contained
P.,

F.2d

Newport New Gen.

648

(4th

Cir.

Arkansas

Education

446

763

F.2d

certified);
F.:'d
4 6) .

ro

Ass'n.

(10th Cir.

v.

(class

v.

Board

1971),

Associated

1977),

numbering
of

100

fewer members,

Nonsectarian Hosoital Ass'n.,

1967),

(8th Cir.
Horn

&

than

is still satisfied as

recent cases have upheld classes consisting of
Cypres v.

less

13

certified);

Education of

!plaintiff class
Wholesale

of

Grocers,

375

Portland,
17 members
Inc.,

555

(reversal of a denial of a class of

Furthermore, the difficulty of joining even a smaller

:1urnber of

plaint~ffs

:or

i;-,

exa:np.:..e,

::_;.;:---::er:_:_·-~

•..;i.:..:.

JOlnci.er

a.c:.1-.::--. ;". .i.=

~;.e

be

:::u.~

_ ..

Rule 23 (a) (2)--There are Questions
Law or Fact Common to the Class.

of

'..mpract1~able;

:nost cases,
:.:-:e
:-:....:..rr,be.r
:.:-.at
·,..·.:___
-·
itself satisfy t:-ie la) I: I crerec;u~s~>:e
should be :nuch lcwer.
"'.''."le =i::1::u:t::·
inherent in joini:-ig as few as '~ er 30
class members should raise a presumption
that joinder is impracticable, 'lr.d <::~e
plaintiff whose class is that large or
larger should :neet the test of' 2 3 1 a) I:)
on that fact alone.
-::oinder of lar:;er
classes might sometimes be practicable,
or the action might '.'ail to meet the
superiority
test
of
23ib)(3),
and
JOinder of a smaller c:ass wi:: o:ten be
impracticable
because
of
the
circumstances of the particular cases;
but the plaintiff whose class numbers in
the
25
or
30
range
should
have
a
reasonable chance of
success on
the
basis of numbers alone, Newberg, Newberg
on Class Actions, §llOSb at 174 1197~).
D.

Rule
class

treatment

23 (a) 12)

is

Utah

appropriate

R.

where

:r.a:

Civ.

P.,

provides

there

are

"quest1cns

c:

law or fact common to the class."
Rule
questions of
they exist,

fact

or

F.R.D.

66

Folding

does

not

law predominate.

Sommers v.

Association,
Virginia

23 la I I 2 l

Box

require
It only

that

requires

Abraham Lincol.n Federal Sav1r.gs
581

Co.,

IE.D.
6l

Pa.

F.R.D.

312

of

or

Rule 23 (al (2):
359

(S.D. N.Y.

in

common

Leisner
C.9~31.

~-

to

sat1s:y

New York

Loar.

IE.D.

it has been held that there need be en:::· cne
fact

tha:

Crockett

Indeed,
law

comrr.cr.

the

!eleoho~e

=uest1~c.

prer:-equ1s1i:e
~·=

: ~3ss

?aid :nor.e;· \Jr propert:' ':.o de::enci.ant 9ursuant

~embers

tr.e

sa1,1e

cl t~;

was

declared

ordinance.

.:...:.1

inva:id.

Each

would

must

benefit

rely

if

on

the

tne

to

ordinance

same

law

in

seeKing to have it declared invalid.
E.

Rule 23(a) (3)--The Claims of the
Representative Parties are Typical
of the Claims or Defenses of the
C ass.
Rule

23(a) 13)

Utah

R.

class treatment is appropriate if
the

representative

parties

are

Civ.

P.,

provides

that

"the claims or defenses of
typical

of

the

claims

or

defenses of the class."
Rule

2 3 (a) ( 3)

requires

that

claims

of

representative parties be "typical"--not "co-extensive with" or
"identical to" those of other class members.

The requirement

of typicality may be satisfied even though there are varying
fact patterns, support claims, or defenses of individual class
members,

or

though

there

is disparity

in damages

claimed by

representative parties and other members of the class:
Seasons Securities Laws Litigation,
1973) .

The

typicality

requirement

59 F.R.D.
of

667

Rule 23

(W.D.

requires

Four
Okla.
only

that the named plaintiffs show that other members of the class
have suffered the same grievances of which he complains.
v.

Gates

Rubber

Co.,

53

F.R.D.

412

(D.

Colo.

White

1971)

All

members of the class are in the same position since all were
required to give up property pursuant to the same ordinance:
Typicality
the claim or
representative,
facts :rom which

refers to the nature of
defense of the class
and not the specific
it arose or tc the

relief sought.
Factual differences ~1 :
not render a claim atypi=al L" ~~e -.a1rr
arises from the same e'·ent ,::ir ?racti=e
or course of conduct t~at g1·:es rise ts
the claims of the class members, and is
based
on
the
same
legal
theory.
Newberg on Class Actions, §1115 c.
See
F.R.D.

213,

also

219

Gerstel

(D. Colo.

v.

Continental

Airlines,

Inc.,

50

1970)

To say that plaintiff is not an
adequate representative simply because
her claim is not identical with that of
all other class members is to require,
in any class action, that the claims of
each member of the class be absolutelv
identical.
The rule does not requir~
this much.

F.

Rule
23 (a) (4)--The
Regresentative
Parties will Fairly an
Adeauately
Represent the Class.
Rule

class treatment

23 (a) (4),

Utah

R.

if

"the

is appropriate

Civ.

P.,

provides

that

representative parties

will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."
The
comprises

only

two

of

requirement
elements:

that
with

the

interests

of

the

members

of

the

party

class;

that the representative party and

(2)

coincide

the

representation

representative
and

must

( l)

adequate

his

can be expected to prosecute the action vigorously:
First

Republic

Corp.,

43

F.R.D.

465

(S.D.N.Y.

attorne''
Mersay

1965).

'i.

Bot~

elments are present in this case.
POINT IX
THIS
ACTION
SHOULD
BE
MAINTAINED AS A CLASS ACT:ot1
SINCE THE
PREREQU~SITES
OF
RULE 23(b) ARE PRESENT
In order to bring a class action,

.cs

the pla1nti:•s rru

0

t

a~~

:our

:i:: tne requirements of Rule 23 la).

need

Rule 23 lbJ.
.J59

:neet

only

one

of

the

of

19~'41

Rule 23 lb) ( l) (A) --Inconsistent or
'larv ing Ad] udica tions with Respect
to Individual Members of the Class
would Create a Risk of Establishing
Incompatible Standards of Conduct
for Defendants.

A.

The focus of Rule 2 3 (b) I 1) (A)
of

requirements

Albertsons Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 502 F.2d

llOth Cir.

interest

However,

the

party

opposing

Federal Savings and Loan,

the

63 F.R.D.

class,
631

is to protect the
George

(N.D. Ga.

v.

United

1974).

The

purpose of the rule is to protect a defendant from the legal
quagmire

which

might

result

if

one

court

were

to

order

defendant to take certain action which another court orders the
same

defendant

not

to

take,

Bogosian v.

Gulf

Oil

Corp.,

to

the

62

F.R.D. 124 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
The

advisory

committee

notes

Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state:
Claus.e (A)
One person may have
rights
against,
or be under duties
toward, numerous persons constituting a
class,
and
be
so
positioned
that
conflicting or varying adjudications in
lawsuits with individual members of the
class
might
establish
incompatible
standards to govern his conduct.
The
class
action
device
can
be
used
effectively to obviate the actual or
virtual
dilemma
which
would
thus
confront the party opposing the class.
The matter has been stated thus:
'The
felt necessity for a class action is
greatest when the courts are called upon
to order or sanction the alteration of
the status quo in circumstances such
that a large number of persons are in a

29

1966

position to call en a si~.o 'e persc·n
alter the status quo, er •o cc~p~~1n
it
is
altered,
and
t'1e
pcss101~1t
exists that I the] actor mignt be cci..
upon
to
act
in
inconsistent
'.va; s.'
Louisell
&
Hazard,
Pleading
and
Procedure:
State
and
Federal
~19
(1962);
see Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366-67 11921).
To
ITIUStrate:
Separate
actions
5V
individuals against a municipality to
declare
a
bond
issue
invalid
or
condition or limit it, to prevent or
limit
the
making
of
a
particular
appropriation or to compel or invalidate
an assessment, might create a risk of
inconsistent or varying determinations.
In the same way, individual litigations
of the rights and duties of riparian
owners, or of landowner's rights and
duties respecting a claimed nuisance,
could
create
a
possibility
of
incompatible adjudications.
Actions by
or against a class provide a ready and
fair
means
of
achieving
unitary
adjudication.
[Emphasis added.]
Notes
of
Advisory
Committee
on
Rules;----3'9
F.R.D. 100 (1966).
It
within

the

appears
rule,

that

the

(see

also,

similar

vein,

present
Horst

v.

case

falls

Guy,

squarel;

N. W. 2d

2 11

(N.D. 1973)).
In

a

class

actions

have

been

upheld

under Rule 23 (b) (1) (A) on claims that a utility has overchargec
its

customers,

Cass

Clay

Inc.

v.

Northwestern

Public

Service

££..:_, 18 F.R.Serv. 2d 1187 (D.S.D. 1974).
Finally,

identical cases

to

the

present one wherein

subdividers have brought suit against a municipa!1ty seeking to
have

an ordinance

requiring dedication

of

land

er

payment

money declared invalid, have been maintained as a class action
City of Montgomerv v.

Crossroads Land Cc.,

1978); Cimarron Corp.

v.

946

(Colo.

1977).

Bd.

3'i': Sc.

:a

of Count·; :ornrniss1.=nt-?::-::o,
1

3o3

:t)J

!Ac~.

?.:·-~

:::'1;;al::,.1

3cti=ns.

,

this

case

Here, the taxpayer
Such

i~legal.

taxpayer

seems

similar

to

taxpayer

class

(subdivider) challenges the tax as

actions

are

routinely

certi:ied

as

class actions, see e.g. United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate
Tax

Comm.,

Massell,

356

18

F.R.Serv.2d
F.Supp.

291

281

(S.D.N.Y.

(N.D.Ga.

19731;

1974);

Mathews

Booth

v.

v.

General

Dynamics Corp., 264 F.Supp 465 (N.D.Ill. 1967); Bootery Inc. v.
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 326 F.Supp. 794
(D.D.C. 1971)

I

/ J:: ""
DATED this ~day of

!

(!J

lz ,

&~SSOCIATES

ROBERT J. D;BRY
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF H.:l.ND JEL: .. DR'i

I hereby certify that a
foregoing A
_/_q_-:JJ_hday of

true ar.c

Brief on A oeal

i-1-.:..:...:i...:o.-<...+_ _ ,

1983, to tne

Stephen Homer
West Jordan City Attorney
1850 West 7800 South
West Jordan, Utah 84084

was

:crrec~

~anj

:c;:;·;'

·ieli';ered this

to~lowir.g:

The Clty O:wi-.:11 of the City

or

·~est

Jordan

o~ns

as

{ 0 11 a.r.!I :

Section 1.

That Ord1nar1ce ~

33 or the 'lest Jordan City

ordinance relati.n,; to subdivi.sion.s be airended by add1.cg the

!allowing section.
Section 9-C-3 (a).

Io

~tiC<J

to all the other requirSll:!ots

prescribed under this ord1N1..1ce the subdivider shall be required
to dedicate seven per cent (7.0%) of the land a.rea c! tlle proposed
s:..ibd1v1sion to the public use for the benefit and use or tbe citizens
of tbe City or West Jurdan and shall rucvey title

at tbe same to

tbe City by a proper conveyance instl'Ulalt, or ill the alteoative
at the optioo o! the t;0vern!.ng b:dy

or the City, the City may accept

the equivalent value o! the land in cash it it deallS advi.5able.

Section S-C-8 (b).

The ITDl'lics received by the City as a

result

of the requirement,,; of Section 9-C-8 (a.) herei.nabove shall be used by t~

City for its flood control and/or parks and recreat1ooal !a.cilities.

Sect ion 2.

This orainlflce shall becaae e!fect1ve tweoty (20)

day9 after its ;xis ting in three ( 3) public places or 30 cia.ys a!ter

publ1catlon in a n<.>NSpaper of i;eneral circulaticc.

Section 9-C-8 (c).

In the event the City governing body electa

to receive the =nies perst.!.JJlt to Section s-c-8 (a.) said m:Xlies aball
be pa.id by the sutxlividcr m or bdor? fin.al approval o! tbe plat 1a

given by the City Q.Junc11.

PA.SSm

,-:ill

ALGPTIIl this 21st d.•y o! January, 1975 by the City

:::CUllc11 Qf tr.e City of West Joni:ln .

.\PPE;;orx

",'\"

----------"'~...: ... 'M"' t . . . . . hF"'C--MM-t ~

.·ny OF WEST JORDA:-<

C.\Ll ,

1

( 1·e a'!>.

with one J ust1ce con
specially concurr1::2-

John 'ALL J.nd Clark Jen~1n-..

Plaintiffs and Appell

1;ib,

No. 15908.
Dec. 26. 1979.

.i. Eminent Domain ~2(1.2)

Subd1v1ders brought action to challenge
\';\~ d1ty 0f ordinance adopted by city which
req·J:r~d sub<liv1ders to dedicate 7% of propo::it_·•I subdivision land to city or to pay
er~·J11. tlent of that value in cash to be used
for ilrind control and/or park and recre;ttion
i.1u11t1e::.
The Third District Court, Salt
L.ike l'uunty, David K. Winder, J .. upheld
\ai1dit) nf ordinance and denied subdivider's requests for injunctive relief and dam-

ages. and subdividers appealed. The Suµrem1• Court, Crockett, C. J, upheld validity
0i ordinance.
Affirmed and remanded
Stewart, J., concurred and filed opin·
ion
Wilkins, J., dissented and filed opinion
1n which '.\1.aughan, J, concnrred
I. Zoning and Planning G:=>86

City had authont) to enact ordinance
wh1cr requ1rf'd ::.11hrliv11le;o::; t0 derlicate 7~
"'

; , I

l~

.<..1..:..:t 1r1 c.:.1::.h, tu Uc useJ r'ur
flcw:><J o...ontrol .ind/or pdrk Jnd recreation
~!: ..H

(Per Crocht.'lt, C J, 'J.'1th one
lOncurring anJ one Jud[;I::' sµec10.lly
UC A l!JS3. :u~ "'l .'t-, 10 9 1,
IO 9 :1, 10 lJ-19 d ~eq. 10-9-~0. 10-'.} 2:2,
lU 'J ~)
i:Jc1l1L1e::.

Jucl~l·

cun(' irring)
1

Zuning- J.nd PIJ..nn1ng --=.%

th.it dtd1t'.L[,,in ,,f
:-.,ioin l..lnd 1rCJ •r .ts

~ tct

7~

1Jf pn1p0scd
. .i.lut' -t..1 -., .\•JI ,1 :,,

ca~h

'1nl,· 'nmriun1t .J1d
·1rd1nJ.n( 1· .\ r :• "1 ; rq1 1dt" (,Jr

'.1' ~'.··n(·r.tl '>\clf,1n· ,,/ .1
·1r1t

~lJ"'l

Ji1d:L[,·
1:1d

)\"

\ '. ··•11

I

p ...

and one J ust1ce

specific purpose. it '.'iecor:1es a trust fund
committed to carry1.1g out that purpose.
(Per Crockett, C. J., with one Justice con·
curring and one J u::.uce specially concurring.)

Supreme Court of Gtah

-,ul

~ r'.'"1 ~.g

217

3. Trusts -30 1h( i I
If money is coii.-1_· 1_2f:! from public for

t'ITY UF WEST JORDA'.. L:tah,
Defendant and Respondent

~

Utah

Ltah. 606 P.2d 217

1' ri" !\<:::'Lt,

J .

City, which received :$16.576 from sub·
dividers under ordinance requiring subdi·
v1ders to dedicate 7% of proposed subdivision land ~a or to pay equivalent of that
value in cash to be used for flood control
and/or µark an<l recreation facilities, was
not taking !and under power of eminent
domain without following requirement of
paying just compensation but was merely
imposing reasonable regulations on subrli·
v1ders as prerequisite for permitting ere·
ation of subdivision. (Per Crockett, C. J.,
with one Justice concun1ng and one Justice
specially concumng.)

5. Zoning and Planning "=602
Question of percentage of !and in subdiv1s10n to be committed to public purpose
1s within pr2rogative of city council to cietermine, and so long as it is within reasona·
ble limits, so that it cannot be characterized
as capricious or arbitrary, courts wl!I not
interfere therewith. (Per Crockett, C. J.,
with one Justice concurnng and one Justice
spec1a!ly concurnng)
h. 'Zrqi:il..;

-~"d

PL111n.115?'

==-.:.)

Ortlinance .vh1t'.h rc4u1red subdiv\ders
to deJic.J.tL' 7'0 uf µroposerl subtliv1sion land
or to pay e4u1valent of that value in ...:ash to
be used for f!ooJ control and/or park and
recreation factlitie!:> was within scope of
pov.ers granted to city so that it could plan
for gener-J.l good vf communrty as well as
for ne\\ly cre:i.ted suh01\'1s1on (Per Crock·
ett. C J, with one Ju<;tlCe concurring anJ
one Justice specially concurring l

7 Zoning and Planning C=382.1
Pa;. mc>r:l ~u city of ca5h e4u1valenl of
7'": of ~u1Hl1\ hl(Jn lanJ areJ., \\ h10..:h \\ J.$
rn.ide µur:-;uanL to ordin.'.'l.nce for general

.:i..PPF.NDTX

11

'R"

I!
'

l

j,

!

I

I

r:

I

218

606 P.\CIFIC REPORTER, 2d ,[;;:;_,,

Lt<!h

µur:.__032 of parks. recreation '..ic:lities and
f\ova cnntro!, was not necessard;. to be 11sed
sole!:; :·or subdinders' subd:\:s10n or ,my
other particular one; it did not prevent city
from imposing reasonable condition of construction of storm sewers and did not prevent city from refusing to credit subd.iv1ders with cost of storm sewers against cash
they paid. (Per Crockett, C. J., with one
J u.st1ce concurring and one J usttce specially
concurring.)
Robert J. DeBry and Vaiden P. Livingston, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
)-;ick J. Coless1des, Salt Lake City, for
respo!1dent.
CROCKETT, Chief Justice:
Plaintiffs John Call and Clark Jenkins,
subdividers, brought this act10n in which
they challenge the validity of an ordinance
adopted by the defendant City which requires that subdividers dedicate 7 percent
of the land to the city, or pay the equivalent of that value in cash, to be used for
flood control and/or parks and recreation
facilities. The district court upheld the validity of the ordinance d.nd denied plaintiffs'
request for injunctive relief and damages.
The latter appeal.
Plaintiffs contend that the orriinance is
invalid because: (1) it is not within the
City's granted powers; (2) the land or the
money required is not for the benefit of the
subdivision, but rather the City as a whole;
(3) that the City is attempting to exercise
fre >Y' t•r ,,f e1':':1~-~n~ dnrn..i1n .qthn11t fnlk,1" .:- .., l~~ r·equi:·1·i11e~L.., ~hereuf :ind pci) 1ng
just rnmpensation; and l4) it un!awfu!ly
imposes a tax.

On January 21, 1975, the City amended
an existing ordinance (~o. 33) relating to
subdivisions by ad<ling the following·
Section 9-C-8(a). In addit1un to all the
other r~quirements prescribed under this
ordinance the suhdh-1der shall be required
to rlt:dicate se~·en percent ('i.0%) of !he
land area of the propose1i suhdi•·is1on to
the public use for the hcnefit and use nf
I.

Johnson ~- S:mdy Cay Corp

· r:e .uter:iatl\ e .lt '.ht'
~10n of :.1e

., "'r'11r.1.; · Ll\..l'.,

r.he Cit) ·:i_c,
of the ...ina

,,~·eo[ ~:;1.: ~una1ent •.J

1[ ·"he

1

_,i.-;n :r" .t deems adv1san.t::

Sections 9~C-~1J1 and 1,i 1 further prov ,Jt>
that the money received "sha!l be used b:,
the City for its ilood control and/or parks
and recreat10r.a! :'..1.i.::1i1ties" and that ·f ~he
City elects to rei.::e1ve money in lieu of ~and,
payment shall be made "by the subdivtder
on or before final approval of :he plat lS
given by the City Councd."

On ~lay 2, 1977, the plaintiffs pre;ented
to the City ~\VO piats and maps for a proposed "Wescall subdi1.rision" which, 1f approved, would result in the future development of 92 lots on about 30 acres of L.rnd
located in the City. When the City exercised lts option to accept money in lieu of
land, plaintiff Cbrk Jenkins paid, under
protest, $16,576.00, representing aOOut 7
percent of the value of his land. The City
Council then approved the subdivis10n and
the plats were recorded. The City refused
p!ainttffs' demand to refund the money and
this action resulted
In rejecting plaintiffs' attack upon the
ordinance, the trial court stated in its memorandum decision:
As it affects the plaintiffa. 1t is the
opinion of this Court that the City ol
West Jordan, Utah's r)rd1nance 33, <lS
amended January 21. 197.S, is v~lid and
constitutional. It is further the Cnurt's
0pinion that there has be~n no taking uf
• ~. --: , ~ , r ,, - , j , ~ n t_

·.1;cnuut. J'_,:)l

,_.,r~µo;::~,,L,[.,,.,1

-:r1r n..i. ... :>:e

defendant :ev1ed an 1n\'a)i,j ~a\ uµor. thL'
plaintiffs. See Secs. 10-9-1 through 109-30, L' C.A 1953. [Citing case-> J

The Authonty of the City
[1] It is not questioned that l'1t1i.·~ 11,ne
no inherent sovereign po\H:r, but .inl:. 1
grantt::d hy the !eg-islaturt' 1 But it rr1w·.t 11L·
realized that 1t 1s 1mpract,•',il '.-,Jr :ol.1lL.l1:.~ :,1
sp~li uut to the b:)l dt-'l..i., ,di ,1f t!:t> ~h1n1-:
•'ll:, government.:, mu-.;t do •_n pt'rfur·'11 · h"
2& L::ah 2d 22 . .\91 p ..:d •J44 ,

I
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prl:'fl 1,~,,

,•.~n

~.-··

'~at ,_'ltl+_·:o

'h!id

r

.r:

<1rc ~'>.pressly h"T:ln'•'•i

;i

,;.1r.>.

,mµl1ed

'. .J.rr:.

~u

pu!J1w

J' t'

·~r.

"'I)

"uch re·

J.re a sene::; ,>i )~atutes through
',he City .Jerives its 1uthority to enact
11rt\1:1ances qf the character here 1n ques-

shall be held 'u;

,TJ.J.~

J.dopt said regufaur,ns

[all ':'.mpn~1:> herein added.)

~ht->rP

8->$4,

L

c ..\

'.953. grant;

IQ

r1t1es the authority and the duty

to preserve the heaith, safety
:rnd good 0rder 0f t.he en:.- and 1~ 1nhab1tJ.nts.

Pus idea 1s carrie<l forward and echoed in
.3ect1on 10--9-1, lJ C.A. 1953, which provides
that
For the purpose of promoting health,
safety, morals and the general welfare of
the community the leg7siat1ve body of
cities and towns is empowered to regulate
and restnct
the location and
use uf bu1lding'3, structures and land for
trnde, industry, residence or other purposes
Further dealing with that subject and more
specific as to the establishment of parks,
SecL10n 10-'.3-3 '.)tates that such regulations
shall be made in accordance
with a comprehensive plan designed to
facilitate adequate provision for
transportation, water, sewage, schools,

parks .ind other public requirements.

The ~tun11.:qJal Planning Enabling Act 1
empowers a city to have a planning commL>s10n which may "adopt and certify to
thl.' IL:hrislat1ve ho<ly. a master plan for the
4
\1 ,,,
• : •lllf I t ,ir T [lt:' .-,l..ld1'IP..l .. : / . "
:::, .. ('.Jun lU··'.::J l..!. ,c..i.te;:, Lh..i.. the

p!..i.nnin~

1·ornm1s:.10n "sh:.dl have such powers as may
la:: net.:l''.'.>Sarv to enable 1t •o perform its
funct1uns .J.r;d pr0mote municipal planning"
S1gn1f1cantly, St.:dion lU-'..-1-25 then pro'. 1dt>s

Jn 1·xpn·1sing tfw po\\<;r::> gi-:::inted to it
11:, 1h .. del, the µf,u1n1r.g c·1>mm1::.~;on
~.

~ht:reon

e ·,•Jd'., .:i.fter which the ,'t_·g'.)-

for the munic1pJ./1ly

,1.t"",.~h

Sec 10-

1c ••

i:J.ln e

~r ,•"-,dl!ill 1es 2

r.on

'1l ,r1n'd;

'.he Ii·>('

•_no,,e
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the :,uhd1,,,·,':h1n the municipa/1t_i.
A

'L''~·'...1l1on> go~·erning

':iee

:,ha.fl

'>.1/r LJkr' c:.1\
Re1t!M~ :01 l'Dh 514.
I ..'·l P .'J ci 17, 1 '.'42,
ind nuu v S.i/C L.Jkl:' C1c~
·~'P l~t.111 'iC,11 P ~J ..'V..', ':f-f:>1

( ...\

l'JS"'.

If lhe ,lf)<l\'f:" statutes are viewed together,
and 1n <i.ccordance with their intent a.nd
purpose. is tht:!y should be, it seems plain
enough that the ordinance in quest10n is
within the scope of authonty and respong1!:nlity of the city government in the promotion of the "health, safety, morals and general welfar~" of the commun1ty.s
Just how essential and desirable it is that
cities have such authority in planmng their
growth is brought into sharp focus hy reflecting, on the one hand, upon the conditions in the slum and ghetto areas of various cities, where there are none. or inadequate, parks and playgrounds and, on the
other, upon the enrichment of life which
has been conferred on other cities where
there are parks, plazas, recreational and
cultural areas (some of which are very famous) for the use of the public.
In modern times of ever-increasing population and congestion. real estate developers
buy land at high prices. From the combined pressures of competition and desire
for gain, they often squeeze every lot they
can into :some labynnth1an plan, with only
the barest minimum for tortious an<l circuitous streets, without any a.rterial ways
through such subdivision::;, an<l with little or
no provision fqr parks, recreat10n areas, or
t.:\-"!1

f,)r

r.t.:~d

!1.':-:

r,·

"t.:lb').\

'.::>V'l:ll11,.,

f'lL"C"

·rn~ .,:~::<-rJ.1 p•, ~!t!ng

Tht>

Lill.I LUlt 1.!.•JI

is apparent. and mah.es mamfest the wisdom 1.mderly ing Lhe deleg:J.tion of powers to
the c1t1es. as is done in the statutes above
referred to
A.s unUeveloped land is improved, it is
.ilso important that some provision for Oood
control be mo.de. To the extent tht1.t the
.i.

l0-9-20. UC ...\ 1953

5.

L.Jngu.:i.ge from Sec

!0-9 \.UC A

1953

;

1

i
'
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establishment of suhcii,·:sions increases the
need for flood cor.trc•i measures or recreationa! facilities, it 1::. huth fair and essential
that subdivider.; be required to contribute

to the costs of providing those facilities.
Lack of Benefit to the Subdivision

[2] In their point :-lo. (2), the plaintiffs
attack the ordinance on the ground that the
lan<l dedicated (or the money in lieu thereof) is not to be used solely and exclusively
for the benefit of the created subdivision.
They point to the provision that the land is
received "for the be:nefit and use of the
citizens of the City of West Jordan" and the
money is used for "its [West Jordan's) flood
control and/or parks and recreation facilities."
Wie agree that the dedication should have
some reasonable relationship to the needs
created by the subdivision.' But in the
planning for the expansion of a city, it is
obvious that no particular percent.:i..ge of
each subdivision, or of each lot, could be
used as a park or playground in that particular subdivision; and likewise, that it could
not be so used for flood control. But it is so
p!ain as to hardly require expression that if
the purpose of the ordinance is properly
carried out, it will ~dound to the benefit of
the subdivision as well as to the general
welfare of the whole community. The fact
that it does so, rather than solely benefiting
the individual sub<livision, does not impair
the valiqity of the or<linance.7

[3] These ob::;crvations are also pertinent: Although the money which was collected from the plaintiffs in this c:ise was
f'i

S····
fnt

~

~Cd.kTTk"l> .. 1 .411111
r·/J;in1u~

Y~'-''

~ O•nr111:;s1cir1

8.

15 McQutllin, Municipal Corporations, Sec
39 45 states that: "Special funds .J.re often created
for a particular purpose, and in
such case lhe general nde is that they cannot

Lhe

qf no special hen•;:· ~u the J.rea
sougnt ) be subdivided. Ori ~~1e .~ontrary.
thJ.t 1t ...-,]] be used for its ::.tJ.~e<J iJUrpose is
assured, iirst, by the integrity and good
faith of the public offic1a1s ch.lrge<l with
th:i.t responsibility. and seconO, by the fact
that the recogmzed principle 1s ~hat if money is collected from the public fur a specific
purpose, 1t becomes a trust fund committed
to the carrying out of that purpose. 8
::i

The Emment Domain Issue
(4] There is an obvious fallacy in the
plaintiffs' argument that the City has not
followed the proper procedure for taking
plaintiffs' property under eminent domain.
This is not a proceeding initiated by the
City to acquire property.• It has indicated
no desire to compel the plaintiff to subdivide their property, nor to dedicate any part
of iL The plaintiffs are the moving parties,
and as a prerequisite for permitting the
creation of the subdivis10n, the City, under
the powers conferred upon it as hereinabove discussed, can and does impose reasonable regulations. 10
Invalidity as a Tax
Plaintiffs urge that the requirements of
the ordinance in question are but a revenueraising scheme for the purpose of meeting
the financial needs of the City, and thus
constitute an improper levy of a tax upon
their property. This labeling is but an ex-

01c_j,=:e Esrate-J11bur·..

Ayres v City Council, 34 Cal.2d 3 I. 207 P 2d
I (1949); Associated Home Builders. Inc. v
City of Walnuc Creek, 4 Cal 3d 633, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 630, 484 P 2d 606 (1971)

;'und.

,r,ey :hu:.

hh,,'1'>-'.-. _ieiab!e fur other ;:i,.r, ''~e::. ~):

br-

..1 , ... •!

ior

.i.1

..1 "..1nd

J{ u

(1977)

'ie a.ssumed

11,ir

C. r.:; :. ·:d

Conn.Sup. 74, 230 A.2d 45 l 1967); f\.rughoff v
City of Naperville. 68 !ll.2d 352. 12 Ill Dec. 185.
369 N.Lid 892 (1977), Home Bwlders Ass'n v
City of Kansas City, 1\.10 • 555 S. W 2d 832

7.

n the City's ;· '"'L
~h,1: ': e

d:OP•'"·:~·l

shr,u,.J

,n,or
r~.~e'~

,.i·J~~,,,_.·

tn , .:

L.;11..:ip:...:,l\ f.·r

c1

special purpose is a trust fund. :md eqwly will.
tn a proper case. interfere lo prevent its d1vers1on." (Citing ca~es J
9.

See Ayres v CH.~ Council. supra. note -:.
Perrerson ~· City of 'la.pernile. 9 lll2d 233. l JI
N.E.2d 371 tl956J

10. Billings Properr1es
Inc
Ye!/01~'~tone
Councy. 144 Mont 25. 394 P 2.J 182 187 ( 1964 ),
City of Albuquerqui:> ~
77 'J \.1 "IJ.
4!9 P 2d 460 \1966\
\.11dweq Cil\',

Inc v
(1975)

BuJ/dcr~

Old

539

P 2d

13-7

,.,LL' CITY OF \lhT JtlRDAN
Cite-

: .,I

1:1

as., Utah, 6Gt. p .'.J ~I 7

'...Jl;.,. 1q10n It
! t '1J.::. w.-.n ..1djud1ca.ted
1,0 l JUl h ..J.n ordin:.ir.:e, 1f :e.bonably de-

,1gnd . tnJ carried r):..it fnr lhe µurpose 1n·
>·ndcd. 1~ a. proµer form of planning for the

;ood 1Jf the community, :.ind is not such a
~roh1 bt ted tax . 11

[5]

The question as to the percentage of

:he lanrl tn the suh•ltv1s1on {in this instance,
i rerrent) to be committed to the public

purpose 1s within the prerogative of the
City Council to determine, and so long a.s 1t
1s w1th1n rea.son:ible limits, so that it cannot
be characterized as capnc10us or arbitrary,
the courts will not interfere therewith. 12

[6] In harmony with what has been said
above, it is our opimon that the ordinance
under attack is within the scope of the
power.:; granted to the City so that it can
plan for the general good of the community
as well as for the newly-created subdivis10ns
We have deci<led the principal issue which
was addressed by the parties in the district
court, and 011 this appeal, as to the validity
of the ordinance. However, we observe
tt.at in the averments of the affidavits,
there are other matters which may need to
be resolved on reman<l; and accordingly, it
1s deemed appropriate that we make some
addit10nal comments. 13
There. is no question, but that the ordinance should be applie<l fairly, and without
favoritism or discrimination insofar as that
nn ~w -i.ccomplished In view of the avern11 ~t ~ :,1aint1fi, J.f~1da1. it. ~h,\t. that ;irrnciple has been VJOl.J.te<.1. the trial cu..:.rt
:;hould he concerned with examination into
and resolution of any legitimate issue raised
thereon.
[7] In his affidavit. plaintiff Clark Jenkins .lverrcJ that he not 0nly paid the $16,.)'76 ! <L"surned to be 7 µercent '.)f the value of
11.

Pe/Ccnon v City of :vapt>rv1!/e, supra, note
9, Jen.id ;· 1/1!/age at !:)carsd<J/e. 18 :-.J Y 2d 78,
2-:' 1 N Y '.:> 2d 'JSS. 218 N E :!d 673 ( 1966)

12. For .in f'XLellen( d1:.cuss1nn 0f the vanous
lOn':.t1tut1onJ! chall':"ngec, th..1t haw• been made
re1;.Hdm~ ~ubd1 .. 1su1n leg1<:.IJtlon. ~ee AssoCldf
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028 acres vJ.lued .Jt
CjUIC''d :,i de.J1c::ne
:51,.)ulJ 1nd t1i e\penti .J.bout $19,000 1n cunstru..:t1tu1 •Ji a :.U1rm sewer (which p!a1ntiff
urg~::. , :'loud 1.:(1ntrol) before the City wou!d
appro\ ~ :he suhd1v1s1on.
He asserts that
thc.se a:nounts arc 1n excess of the 7 percent
required by t.he orJinance. The City's affida1. it st.at.es that .t received the $16.576, but
says nothing about receiving the other
amounts JUSt r~ferred to. It is, of course,
essential that the amount the Cily exacts
pursuant to the ordinance is not more than
the 7 percent of value of plaintiffs property 1t prescribes

Our final observation is on plaintiffs' urgence that the $19,000 they expended in
constructing a st.orm sewer should be credited uµon their obligation under the ordinance. From what has been said in this
decision, it should be sufficiently plain that
the 7 percent exacted pursuant to. the ordinance is for the general purpose of parks,
recreation facilities and flood control, and is
to be so administered and expended hy the
city government for that purpose; and that
it is not neces.sarily to be used solely for th~
plamtiffs' subdivision or any other particular one. This does not in any way prevent
the City from imposing other reasonable
conditions upon the approval of a subdivision and proposed construction therein, including requiring a storm sewer if the conditions are such that it is needed in that
subdivision for the protection of future residJ:>nts thereof or other residents of the City.
\Ve t!i~~for ... (h not ·lis.1.:{ree "~irh ~he
City'.::; requ1n::mt:nl of the stvrm >t'\\ll::r, ""!' ·r
with 1ts refusal to credit the plaintiff with
the cost thereof on its 7 percent required l>y
the ordinance.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed
anJ the case 1.s rernan<led for further proed Home Builders. Inc ~, City of Walnut Creek.
supra. note 7. Jnd authont1es therein cited

13.

See Rule i6(a). UR C P. LeGr:md Johnson
Corp ~· Peterson. JS UtJh 2d 2GO, -1;!0 P 2d 6!5

(!966)

222

\;tah

606 PACI;'JC REPORTER. cd SERIL.;

ceedings consistent with this opinion
cost:;; awarded.

""

HALL, J., concurs.
STEW ART, Justice (concurri"g)
I concur in the conclusion that ? 9-C-8(a)
of the ordinance of the City oi West Jordan
is authorized by§ 10-8~ U.C.A (1953), as
amended. This statute deleg:i.te:;; to cities
general police power to be used for the
benefit of the city and its 1n:iabitants.
However, the ordinance in question clearly
approaches
constitutionally
protected
rights, i.e., the prohibition against the taking of private property without just compensation. The power of a city, or for that
matter of the state, to require subdividers
to dedicate a portion of their land for public
improvements is not without limitation. In
my judgment, the Court should address the
problem of what standards delineate a constitutional and an uncon~titutional forced
dedication by a subdivider. The question is
certainly one that will recur and ought to
be resolved by the Court.
WILKINS, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion forms a perilous
new rule today by impermissibly expanding
municipal powers, for the first time in this

State, beyond those granted cities and
towns by our Legislature and beyond those
recognized by subdivision, zoning, and municipal government authorities, and it endangers the sound precedent of narrowly
ccnstruing- mun\C'ipal pow~rs whlch h:l::i heen
Jp·,,_:!0p2J ln .~Jit L.JJ..c..' (.~y v. R~11~ne. 1
Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake,' Salt Lake City
v. Suttcr, 3 Tooele City v. Elkington," Nance
v. Mayflower Tavern, 5 Parker v. Pro.,·o
City,• Nasfell v. Ogden City, 7 Bohn v. Salt

Lake City.~ L1ri..
FoJrk City 1: R,i:
3peth, 11 a.n<l utlier

'~
.,,_iJ

·;eJd.9 A.mn.',"ctn
I_,Jyt.._rn City

I sha!l relate ;n:,
., >l° :~1s ~:i.se, as '>veil
as review what I pt>:-~e1.;: ~o be the correct

legal principles J.pµl:,~::i.ole to 1t. All statutory references ue · J r~·~ah Code Annotated, 1953, as amende'.l, rniess otherwise indi1

cated.

Subdividers have ·1nc!er~aken to develop a
subdivision within the City's boundanes and
have dedicated land area and installed
storm sewer facilities '.V1th1n the subdivision
and have additionally paid $16,576 to the
City, all in response to Cty demands made
under authonty of the Ordinance as a prerequisite to subdivision approval. The record and bnefs indicate a dispute as to

whether the land was dedicated and the

money paid under protest. No formal written protest appears in the record, but plaintiffs claim they attended a city council
meeting in which they orally objected to the
land dedication and fee payment.
Subdividers framed their complaint as a
class action seeking a declaration of the
invalidity of the Ordinance on their own
behalf and on behalf of others similarly
situated. Other than a general denial in its
answer and the allegation that the class
consisted of 28 subdividers rather than the
100 alleged by plaintiffs buried within an
affidavit on another subject, the City has
totally failed to address, either here or below, the Sub<livi<lers' class action allegations. The record does not indicate whether
the Di:;tnrt Court m'.1.de 1.:-:v "if the r\i->-tf'rm1Utah Rules of Civrl Procedure, but the
Court disposed of the matter 1n an Or<ler
dated Apnl 21, 1978, denying the Suhdiv1ders' "Motion for Dec!araLon of a Class Ac-

I.

IOI Utah 504, 124 P.2d 537 (1942)

7.

122 Utah 344, 249 P2d 507 \1952)

2.

3 Utah 2d 385, 284 P.2d 702 (1955)

8.

79 Utah 12!, 8 P 2d 591 Rl AL R 215 ( l912J

3.

61 Utah 533, 216 P 234 (1923)

9.

28 Utah 2d 343. 502 P 2d 5:Ji 1.\9721

4.

100 Utah 485, 116 P.2d 406 (1941).

5.

106 Utah 517, 150 P 2d 773 (1944)

6.

Utah, 513 P 2d 169 ( 1975)

10.

77 Utah IG8 ".:!'J2 P 249 (]')JU)

11.

Utah, 578 P 2d 328

1
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CALL '" CITY <JF WEST JORDAN
Cite a!>. Gtah. til>6 P.2d 217

Th\-'

11,,n

mot1011

1'1t.'',

LO

,J1sm1ss

·>a.:i

a::i .,ne ~-qr ..,ummdrJ judgment Un
\lay 17, 1~7~. ~he Distnct C.JUrt ruled ~n
fa'>1Ji uf the City::. motion, 3.nd against the
:)ubd1v1ders' mut1~in, that the Ordin<ince
was >a.lid .ind lhe City's demands were 1n
,ff'~-ttl'd

confurmit:,.

,1,

1th 1t

Except for cities wf11ch operate under
chort~r 12 :.i.nd denve their authonty from
Articlt.: XI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitu-

tion, the c1t1e:-1 of this State are "creatures
statute and limited in powers to those
d~leg-ated by the legislature,
"13
All power and authority of our nonchartered municipalities is derived through legislative grant, and for the Ordinance under
review here to be upheld, it must have been
enacted pursuant to an enabling statute.

o(

Prior to the majority decision here, this
Court recognized that legislative authority
may \J.e exercised by municipalities in only
one of three ways. Justice Wolfe wrote in

Sa.It Lake City v. Revene ·

It has been repeatedly stated by this
court _"that a municipal corporation possessc:s and can exercise the following
power;, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to
the powers expressly granted; third,
those essential to the accomplishment of
the declared oh1ects and purposes of the
corporat1on,-not simply convenient, but
indispensable." 1 Dillon Municipal Corpor•l<on, 5th Eu. p. 448, § 237,
"
[Emµhas1s added ]
'>jJn1!1L ,eF;l.::iLJ.t1o1::

jjrant

oI

puwer the i.!ity

had nn authority to limit barbershop bu.::;i-

nes.s nours for health µurposes under three
statutory grants of power to cities and
towns One statute provided cities power
t(, "lict•nse, tax, ;rnd regulate" barbershops.
\ ·'t'C'ond statute emµo\\ered cities to
µromulgate regulations "'to secure the gen12.

The Cit)

lls~lf

13

in

this case does not represent

to be chartered

H.rtholL '· Cay of S_i/1 L.:1ke si.pra. note 2 at
3 l L'.lh .2d .187. 284 P .2d 703
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er:.i.J health of the city, and -1-.e third broad!;. de!egated to cities :i.uthor1ty to enact
,-ird1nances for the pub11c he:::i.lth. safety,
i)rospenty, morals, peace cin<l good order,
and comfort and con,·emence of the city
and its inhabLtants. That third statute now
appears in our Code as § 10-8-84 and is
relied upon by the City an<l the majonty
opinion as authority for the City to enact
the Ordinance under attack here.
In Salt Lake City v" Sutter." defendant's
conviction for violating Salt Lake City's
prohibition ordinance was reversed, this
C-Ourt holding that the statute enabling
cities to pass ordinances necessary to pnr
vide for the safety, health, mor..ds, comfort
and convenience, again the statute relied
upon by the City and the majority opinion,
did not authorize the City's legislation prohibiting possession of intoxicating liquors.
Whatever power or authority municipalities in this state ha 1:e is derived from
the Legislature.
It will hardly be contended that the
ordinance in question is "essential to the
accomplishment of the declared objects
and purposes of the corporation." As we
have seen, it is not included within any
express grant; nor is it necessarily or
fairly implied as an incident to the powers expressly granted measured by the
rule laid down by the authorities.
IL may be, anrl is, contended that the
ordinance rn question 1s only carrying out
the general policy of the slate as reflected by the legislative enactment making- it ln nff··nse ag-Cli"'::'t ~h2 <st'.lte hw for
.ut_. ~·Pr_,_,.,, t1i ·-.nn,,-1·.5:. ,,,1, ~: 11: :'l 1s ; •·,,se~!:ilOn without authority 1ntox1caling- l1quors within the state. But the policy of
the state cannot control in determining
the powers of a municipality. Those
power; must be measured and determined by the grants found in the charter
or in the general !aws purporting to enumerate such power.::.
14.

Supra, note l

Although cited by the maJor

1ty as authonty for its po::.ition here, Revene

he!d. 1n direct conn1ct ,,.,.1th the majonly, that
the Ordinance enacted by the Cit) exceeded the
CJtv·:. authont~ under the enabling statutes
15.

Supra note 3
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\\.. c.:::i.n ::.ee no escape from the ,~onc:c<
s10~ t:1at the bodrJ of city comm1:-::.1oners
of S.itt Lake City was without ,:rn~;-,orlt_.
to ··.1act :he ordinance 1n question ·Jn ~r.:s
a.pr eai.1s

The requirement that cities must have
express authority to enact ordinances 1s not
unique to Utah. ;\lcQuillin tn .\funicipai
C1Jrporations, and Yokley, 1n The Law ol
Subn1~·1s1ons, state as a general propos1t1on
that dedication ordinances require enabling
legislation.
In some jurisdictions, zoning-enabling
statutes authorize local zoning bodies to
require, as a condition precedent to development. that subd1viders dedicate portions of their property for pub! ic purposes, or pay J.n assessment in lieu of
dedication. There must be express statutory authority granting the power to municipalities to impose such conditions, or
at least language from which the intention to grant the power may be inferred.
11

Further:, judicial scrutiny of a municipal
ordinance differs from that imposed in the
test of a State statute in that the usual
presumption of validity of the sovereign's
action does not apply. In the case of an
ordinance, any reasonable doubt must be
resohed against the municipality's power to
enact it, and any questioned power must be
deni~d. 18
~either party nor the majority opinion
cites any Utah '-'latute directly authorizing
t~
,1- is1 1_·<.1h ;.;n 11 ?lG P
... ~-~Ort ..""'·~ rh1> c.,,. '~ fc•cf'I ... l.. -~~
suprJ. note 4.

\f;.

SERIE~

City ·s enar~·: ,..,1·
~his case.
The ,~"
-f 57- .)-3 19 anu :u ~.:
,·~= 'J , >I · .1e
~,
)p1n1on
L't..ah Corie A.nn
l.'l ...
iinds :iuthortl) for 'he
~ -.irtlOn :n
§ 10-8-84 :i.nd ,,·arious w,
n Title 10,
Chapt.er 9, under :he :hPo~ · :1at :he Ct:;
was acting under those ;J1H'. --:r" neces,J.rily
implied to 1t to carry out · .".ose /:MJwers
expressly grant.ed. Section )7 -::.- :1 governs
the nature of maµs and ;:ihLo, a sutxJivider
must file and have approved
Title 10.
Chapter 9, is a Legislative grant of p<;wer
to cities and towns for the purpose of ~nact
ing zoning regulat10ns to promote the
"health, safety, morals and general welfare
of the community." Chapter 10 also includes the :\1unic1pal Planning Enabling
Act, §§ 10-9-19 through 10-9 3u, which
empowers any city to adoµt a master plan
for the physical development of the municipality and to promulgate regulations to assure that subdivisions conform t~ the master plan. The City has adoµted a ma....o.;ter
plan as contemplated by the Act.
~he

Section 10-8-84 is a broad !:,'Tant of tho:::
State's police po\vers to cities anJ town$
and is frequently referred to 1~ the "g-eneral welfare clause" zo It 1s derived from
Uta.h's earliest laws anJ state5·
They [the cities and townsJ may pass
all ordinances and rules, and make . .di
regulations, not repugnant to law. necessary far carrying into efft:ct ur r/i;:,charging all poarer!' and dutic:5 conferrcrJ /Jy
this chapter. and ::1uch as :1re necessdry

'.?". ...

Al;o
21',::ns<trrr

17. 8 McQu11ltn, Mun.Corp § 25 146a 1 Rev
l9i6). I Yokle}- \tun Corp § 97 tSupp 1973.
p. 179), Accord. Yokley. The W.w of Subd1'-·1s1ons § 15 (1963)
18.

,l\.'ance v .\fayflower Tavern. supra note 5.
Parker v Pro\'O C1cv. :;,upra. note 6 \/J:;,fe, 1 v
Ogden Cicy. supr:i. note i. Salt L.;ke Cir.> v
Re\·ene, supra. note !

\f,1ps and plcJts co be acknnwledg':'J. cert1
fied. approved. Jnd recorded
Such map 'Jr

19.

plat sh;iJI be acknowled~eJ by ~uch owner be·
fore ~ome officer luthonzed i-.,y la\\ to rake 1 ~1e
acknowledgmen1 of con\eyancf's vf :-e-=il .. st.::ite

ed town ~ucri µi..11 ,)r ri1-1µ ~n.J.' :"' Jppro·<-·d by
its governing body. or bv some r1ty or town
officer for that purpose des1gnat~J bv resolu
t1on or ordmance '1f '>UCh go\ erning bod>.
See also~ 5"7~5-1 which states
Such maps J.nd pl.its, when m.lde 1cknowl
e-dged. iilt'd :ind recorded. >hall operate ~,- J.
dedication 0f .ill such stn•ets. ~l\evs ..i.nd other
pub!ic places. and shall .est !he !"" •)f such
parcels of land ;is 3re tht>re1:1 t''-PP""'<;,,(•<J n<tm.:d
or intended tor public uses :n ot.d1 -..n11nt·.
or town for the publLL tor th"" 'I~<'~ 1h1-r1•1n

n..imed or 1ntenJe,J

20.
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f.· ena.s1s ;dded.]

Thi:-

~Petton is not, however, authority for
1)r(linance under attack here. Cases
dec i1-:d under thls statute are emphatic and
exµ:.c:•" 1n limiting its scope. In .Vasfe/J v.
Ogden Cily, 21 the city's power to enact an
ordinance declaring that the presence of a
•eh1cli::: parked in violation upon any public
street Wa!S prima fac1e evidence that the
registered owner committed the violation,
was successfully challenged.
Although
Chief Justice Crockett reasoned there as
here. that what is now Section 10-8-84
implitd to the city the power to enact the
ordinance, the Court held that the city had
been gTanted no express authority to pass
the ordinance, and that the city had no
implied power to pass the ordinance based
upon this general welfare statute or statutes granting cities the right to regulate
the use of streets, traffic and sidewalks.

tlH:

1

The Court has also characterized this
staLute as "merely in aid of the express
powers elsewhere granted" 21 in invalidating a city ordinance prohibiting keeping a
pool table or pla)1ng pool. Anrl in Lark v.
Whitehead; 23 Chief Justice Crockett again
dissenting, the Court held that while the
cities had been expressly granted Legislat1 ve :1u thonty to enact an ordinance punish1q,.:: :_,, r·,nnJ '.
nd'::',.,_..r.t r,r ,J•..:;r)rd~rl: ,_11nduct ,n ~ ~U-;:$- JD, ::)...1.lt. L..J.;.....: l'.1t:, s >nllnance excee<led that statutory gr.int, and
thJ.t .. ven under § 10-8-84, the statute relied upon in the ma3ority optnion here, the
city had no implied power to enact its orct1rlciOC'C

The genera! provisions uf Sec. 10-8-84
<lo not confer :.i.uthonty upon J. municipal
21
22

~upr.1

note '.'

Robinson

al ~upra. note lO .H 77 lltah I i'l. :::02 P 250 Acc·urd, Bulin ., SJU ! Jht' Ci!>
supra nott: 9

23.

'.\me-nc.1.n Fork \-;n

<::upu, note !J

Ctah
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body to abroga.le •_!,.
~t.1,1ns specified
>- c. 10-8-.50,
1n the expres.:, ;JrrJ "
UC.A 1953 In :i,1/~ L,,,.,. 1 ~.ly v. Sutter
this court cited t~1f_' ·x ,'' ll''.e ~hat where
an express author1i s ,P'·"!n to pass ordinances tn a par~.c:J1ar da;:i.; uf cases, followed hy a general authonty to pass all
necessary laws. th~ express authority 1s a
lim1tat10n upon :he general power so far
as it relates to matters which belong to
the class of those enumerated, but which
are not, in terms, ;ncluded. A general
power granted to the corporation to pass
all ordinances necessary for the welfare
of the corporation, is qualified and restricted by those other clauses and provisions of the charter or the general law
whicb specify particular purposes for
which ordinances may be passed. Otherwise, the general clause would confer authority to abrogate the limitations implied from the express provisi!Jns. 14
1

In Layton City v. Speth,"' this Court set
aside a conv1ct10n under a city ordinance
which exceeded the statutory grant or authority from the Legislature. In Layton
City, the city had enacted an ordinance
making it illegal for a vehicle owner to
knowingly and intentionally permit person~
who possess, use, or distribute controlled
substances to occupy his vehicle. The State
statute in effed at the time the ordinance
was enacted granted to cities the power to
prohibit distribution of intoxicating liquors.
narcotics or controlled substances to persons
under the age of twenty~ne. This Court
held ovPr the Jigs.en ts of Chief .Justice
<:roch:o:>tt :i.nrl J11-.tki::> :1.J.11. ~hat the 1.r1~;

nance was not neces:sary fur carrying into
effect the purposes of the statute, w;i,s ~
yond the scope of L€gislative authority
granted to the city, and was therefore invalid.
The remarning statutes cited by the City
and the majority opinion as implied authori24. Id at 28 Utah 2d .346. 502 P.2d 559. Accord,
Allgood v Llrson, Utah. 545 P 2d 530 ( 1976)
25.

Supra. note 11
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·J·.e 1)rdinance .1re
Title ~n. Chapter (J
2.nd §§ 57-5-:3 anJ 57-.i--i.. the pertinent
parts of which are c1teJ 1n footnott: 19 ui
r;

for the City to

,,::;1r.,
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Utah
~;'._L~.

.::~ning statutes found

i'1

this opinion. Clearly. ~he::it: ::-~:.i.tutes do not
grant the City exp!"e.... s authority to enact
the Ordinance nor rto I [ind 1n these stat•Jtes implied authority to enact the Ordinance to carry out puv.ers expressly granted under the zoning- statutes. A generalized difference between zoning statutes and
subdivision controls i:; ~hat zoning normally
prohibits certain uses 0f property, while the
title remains in the private owner, and subdivision controls normally make positive exactions, such as conveyance of the title to
the city, from the pr1vate owner.
[I]t must be kept in mind
that zoning regulations, generally, only
limit the use of the property, whereas
subdivision legislation often exacts a penalty for approval of a desired use. 26
Traditionally, zoning and subdivision
ha1;e been founded on separate legislation
a!'ld administt!red separately. Subdivision
regulation and zoning are frequently interrelated in purpose and technique;
[N)onetheless, fundamental differences
do exist between the two areas. \Vhile
roning involves no more than negative
prohibitions on certain uses of the owner's property, subdivision regulation often
makes positive exactions of the owner.
It may require him to construct streets or
sewers, to convey a portion of his land to
the municipality for public use, or to pay
~'..!.:
'1•1 · ,.,l,,n• ,,f ,,11rli """".str 1 1r~t1on
1~t:~l1:.'.i. ·•'1 .1 ·..L.... ~1
Lr .~ .,"~ ,111t· ·! ·... --1~
this difference necessitate::. a more :>pec1fic test of constitutionality, i. e., the lcgislatJOn should not on!y be .substantially
relat.ed to the public health, safety. morals, or general welfare, but. insofar a.s
dedications, activities J.nd expenditures
are positively reriu1red of the subdivider,
these requirements should be rea..sonabl:
26. Noland v St LOUIS
363, 366 (1972)

Counc.~.

\.1o. 478 5 \\.: 2d

27. Reps & Smith. Control cf L:rban L.lnd S•:b
d1v1s1on, 14 Svracu~e- L Pt>v 417 407 rSµrin~
1963)

rc· ....i.:

sh.,11
'"' h1cr.

·, J1::l ·; '""11l:c::- n,1·:e <(Cnt>r:11I

conre1~~d

~.'le

or ~::.e::,::irnenL

,,·,~·t·r

2:

:u 'evy

::ipe1.:1.1,

~Ernohas1s Ml1Jl'~

Here, the 1:,t;. 1~ not ..ictempting •,, r
the Subd1v1ders' prorert:. from res11k ":,
use tu m•1n1c1p~ii Jse :·ur ,choo!s ..ind ,.,r ..:;
or to otherwise l1m1t •>r proh1b1t its u~<.: i11
this ca~e. the City is rel.Ju.ring ~he SuL•l:' '•I·
ers to con~·ey land to 1t, or to pay :c .J.l:
amount of money equal to the \·alue uf :!1e
land. without remuneratlun. In no sen:;,: .s
this a convent10nal zoning case
Further, §§ 57-5-.3 and 57--S--l cannnt
stand as authority for the Ordinance The
statutes automatically ·;est fee litle 1n ~he
municipal agency upon acknowleOgment
and recordation of the plat. They do not
delegate to the cities anJ towns the power
to enact ordinances exacting property or 1n
lieu fees, without compenSation. from private property owners as a condition to subdivision approval. Nor can such exaction
be read as necessarily or even fairly implied
from those sections
In his review of State statutory authorizations for subdivision control, Yoh.Jey reviews§§ 57-5-1 to 5'7-5-8 of vur Ccxie and
states:
A review of these provisions inJicates
an absence of any standanls l{Overrnng
approval of plats except t1e usual ctirect10ns for delineation of lots and
street:,, that is, there 5eems to be no
authonty conferred for the µromul~at1on
',\[lJLh

1\\)ldJ /'t_•jU.it'

:;l'.

f,l<-<·'·•"i-:

tam conditions JS .1 prerequisite to pl.lt
approval The statute itself ,~nnta1ns nv
proviswns for meeting <:onditwns befure
plat approval ~

Anrler:.on, in The .1mt>nc:l!1 LJ. w of Zunlllg, distrngu1sfi, .._, bdween rcqu:rir:~ .1 ,uh·
div1s1on developer •_o LJ],111 (,)r -,trt'Pb .ind
28. Y.iklev, Th':" L:iw 0( '>ul,J1.1s1r,n~
119631
L-\lthou~l1 th1~ :,.xl '~
q,d d< d

::i

';1;
1

>.1th

f'

\LL '
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~~l

Cole as., UUlh, 6()6 P.2d 217

h1ch he state:-. 'dl1 )e required
w1thuut 5U~Jr11· •. ~:·,n controls, and
"'r1h'h may be required 1n ~n1~ St.J.te under
H ~,'";' )-J and 57-5-4, ::ind >:"Xac~1ng properrv for other municipal purpo~es . .vh1ch he
·,i..1

d

rereatedly states must be rJone pursuant to
strictly construed enabling legislat10n.?9

Finally, the ~1unicipal P!anning Enabling
Act, 30 and spec1fically § 10-9-25, quoted by
the majority opinion, cannot stand a..s sufficient authority for the City to take the
Subdividers' property under its Ordinance.
That Section states· "In exerc1sing the
powers granted to 1t by the act [the ~unici
pal Planning Enabling Act], the planning

commission shall prepare regulations gov-

erning the subdivision of land within the
rnuniciµality."
[Emphasis added.]
Nowhere rioes the .act authorize the planning
commission or any municipality of this
State to take any portion of a subdivider's
property. The act enables municipal bodies
to adort a master plan (which the City has
adopted), establish an official street map
and to zone in conformance with those
plans. It gwcs cities an<l towns the power
to prohibit the issuance of a building permit
or :i.pproval 0f a subdivision which does not
conform to the master plan, and it makes it
a misdemeanor to sell subdivision lots without µtanning commission approval. Again,
in this case, the City is not attempting
either to rezone the Subdividers' property
or to refuse to approve their subdivision
until it conforms to the master plan; the
City, here, is approµnating lhe Sulidivider.:>'
,, .. ,
l'ht: Lc:gi.::.lature lta.::. h~t.l tho 0pµurtun1t1e:. to ~xpressly expand the powers available to mun1c1pa!it1e.::1 in controlling- problems
associated with rapid subdivision development, but 1t has not. as yet, prescribed that
necessary expended jJO\'<er In 1973, a bill
was introduced 1n the Utah Senate which
woulJ have delegated to the cities the power to r1:>quire fees or dedicatwn 0f lanJ or
both cl:::. a conJition for ::i.pµroval ,)f a subd1n.,1on plat
In 1915, a bill amending
29.
~
~

4 Anderson

21 3'• p
l (J"i

2J

~b

The .\rr.NH .rn LJ.w of ZL~mng.

141 11977)
.rnd 23 )'4

;t>e ;;t>rierally

i~

.::J ll5

§ lG-9-2..) \\
~trr>11'..J• -:d in the Utah Senate which ,... cir.,;!li 1a\ e allowed cities dnd
counties to pr0::scribe qualifications upon
subdivider:;, such a.s providing for stvrm
drarnage S!stems, parks and recreational
facilities in ordE:r to gain approval of thelr
gutxiivision rlats. ~either Dill gained the
approval of both Houses of the Legislature.

I have rev1c\ved those statutes characterized by the City and the majority opinion as

enabling the City's actions here, and l remain unµersuade<l that any or all of them
are sufficient to expressly grant or necessarily imply to the City that power which it
seeks to exercise by Ordinance No. 33. As
noted ante, the normal presumptions in favor of the validity of statutes do not generally apply t0 ordinances, and this especially
when the questioned ordinance seeks to .:ippropriate to the government some protected
private right.
There is some difference cif view with
respect to a presumption of power to
enact an ordinance and also with respect
to burden of proof on that issue. Generally, there is no such presumption of validity of an ordinance as against the ob·
jection that no power existed under charter or statute to enact iL In other words,
there is no presumption in favor of the
validity of an ordinance where it is questioned on the ground of want of power to
enact it; on the contrary, power to µass it
must appear to have existed when it was
adopted, if the ordinance is to be sus·
tained. Accordingly, one claiming under
an rmlin:i.nce r:iust hr :::i.bl2 ·.o pr•int to
<'.'.

':~tl•t.! ;ir)

,1, -::'"

.:,""\

-::n..:.l '. • ':,

1r1.0:- ~'l·'ci' ._,)

1n express terms or in terms by wtHch the
power is fairly and nece::isarily implied.
Also, proof of authority to enact an ordinance has been ruled to be necessary
where
objection is made to it
on the ground that it interferes with
common rights. Indee<l. the \•iew has
been taken that with respect LO the exercise of every power by a munic1pal i..:orµorat1on, any reasonable doubt that arises
as to the exislence of the power is Lo be
30.

Sections 10-9-19 to 30

lilJt> PACIFIC REPORTER cd .'ERlb
r·_.::,Jhed against the r:or;1orat1on, and the
t"w.. er is to be denied
Con::.1stently, a
,:_net construction J.g:i:n.:iL '.)rd1nances re.~cncting person.ii :1bert;., property, immunity or pnvilege '" iollowed in many
ca.:-es.
Cert,.11nly, where it is
dear that an ord1n:rnce exceeds the legislative powers oi a city, it will not be

presumed to be valiJ.JI

Only after ordinances are satisfactorily
determined to have been enacted pursuant
to Legislative grants of authority may they
carry the presumption of validity In .lfar-

sh:iil v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah's zoning statutes were declared constitutional and the
City's ordinances, enacted pursuant to those
express grants of authority, were upheld.
At that point, the presumption of validity

attaches to the ordinance under clttack and
it will not be declared invalid unless it is
arbitrary, discriminatory or unreasonable,
or unless it clearly offends :rnme prov1s1on
of the C<mstitution or a statute.JJ

It is also only after a subdivision ordinance has been determined valid that it 1s
to be tested as to its reasonablenes~ in
application to the particular fact situation.
In Jcnad v. Village of Scar.sdale,1-4 cite<l in
the majonty opinion, villages in the State
of New York had been deleg-ated sufficient
gTants of power to require exactions from
sub<lividers, so the question became one of
the reasonableness of the application of the
ordinance to the facts of that case, unlike
our problem here. App!yrng the presumption test to the facts of this case, the Ordinance shoulci fail for want of authority to
en:--.rt it

~,,.1.~rd ~t...:.'•-.:::o h<.l_... en~1·'-C:·.I <lrt1te-, .tuthorizing rnanrlatury detlicatwn of la11d or
in lieu fees as a preref1uis1te to plat approval. These enactments, how~ver. have taken
place with a keen eye to protecting the

rights of privatt! property owner.s.

In Asso-

31.

6 McQuilltn. supra, note 17, § 22.31.

32.

105 Utah Ill, l41 P.2d 704 (1943).

33.

Id .. see also Gibbons & Reed Co. v ."Jonh
Salt Lake City, 19 Utah 2d 3.29. 431 P 2d 559
I 1967).

c1att..''i

!-{

Cret·i..,

~he rT'

1;

Jr!J1n,tnc1.: lic;e ~un :1. ~·d J.t
tack
Bul ~.-,OL'J:Jlt'1J Home Builders doe~
not stan•.: :"r :he tJtopu.'1Uon espoused hy
the majority 1)p1n1on, becau::ie that c3.':>e construeLl an ,mJ.nJ.nce .vh1ch haJ been enacted
pursuant tu :1n express State enabling statute and J nl::'w!y .Jdopted :imenUment to the
C:ilifornia (',mstllullon. And in 19?·t. CJ.11fomia pa.."~ed statutes 36 requiring public
agencies benefiting from the suhJ1v1s1on
dedication to remunerate the deve!oper-ded1cator ior his property.
s1m11.ir

The Subd1v1Jers also challenge the Orrl1nance as an unreasonable exercise of the
police power because the City has deposited
the in lieu fees into its general .'.lCcount,
presumably to be used for genera! City
purposes, and because they claim, the City
has not shown that the exaction from them
is re<l!lonably related to the derr1an<ls µlaced
on the City by their suhdiv1s1uns, and th3.t
thert~fore the exaction benefits others at
their subdivision's expense. The affidavit
of one of the Sub<liv1ders (made a part of
the record) states, and the City doc.., nut
dispute, that the Subctividers' in lieu fees
have been us~ to purchase land for a
water-detention basin to receive run-off
from subdivisions other than the one develope<l by the Subd1v1ders herein
A
the
fees
and

reading of the Ordinance discloses t.h:i.t
land shall he dedicateJ or the in lieu
paid "to ~he public use ior the benefit
use of the citizens nf the City uf We~t

Lic1!Jt1es."
A::, support for their argument, ~he Subdividers cite Weber Ba..sm Home Builders
Ass'n •,' Roy Cityl1 In that ca::ie. the Court
34. \8 NY 2J 78. 271NYS2d 'J55. 2!'\ N
673 t 1966)

35.
I

36

E~d

4 C:d 3d 633 94 Cal Rptr h\q 4H·\ f' 2d '"irlfi
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STATE '
Cite

trud,
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1:i

ird1n._inv·

Crom )12 :o )1 :_~

a~

~'-:-::money

LA 'Dl

Ciali, t>-06?

lnd dtscnrn1nator:: J.
...; hu1kiing perm1L fees

was receJ\'ed

and paid 1ntv tl1~ ~ ', , i;enera! fund, as ci.bo
occurred 1n :n1s ·:i::ie, n0t :1Jr the purpo::.e of

meeting increa::.eU '"sts of regulating building construct1on. but for the purpose of

improving the c:t/s water and sewer systems necess1tatt:J Dy the construction of
new homes and t'or other general purposes.
The Court obserYed that equal protection
and due process pnr.cip!es are violated by
an ordinance which undertakes to impose a
greater burden of general government cost
on one clas.s of rbirlents than upon others
without reasonable basis for classification
and held that an ordinance which imposed a
greater burden on those who built within
the city after the ordinance than before its
enactment was constitut1onally unacceptable" Chief Justice Crockett, wtitmg for the
Court, correctly slated:
The critical question here in whether
lhe ordinance in its practical operation
results in an unjust discriminat10n by imposing a greater burden of the cost of
city government on one class of persons
as compared to another, \Vithout any
proper b;.tsis for such differentiation and
cla.ss1fication. It is not to be doubted
that each new residence has its effect in
increasing the cost of city government;
nor that due to the steadily increasing
costs of everything, including those involved in rendering such services, the city
wou!J have authority to raise the fees
charged for such services from time to
t.11r.o
'\!P'.'t'rtfwlc".~
,~ '.h:-1.~ cn:inectinri

rn•J

~d

223

·'>trl

~t.c:i.use

nl!'l·d ,n 'h1:>

of the

spec1(i 1~

~r.~,;:,

oµin1on.

\L-\LGHA;..-, J., concurs in the .:e1\,;:, <::\in the dissenting opinion of \VIL-

pres..,1:0

Kl:\S. J
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STATE of Utah. Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.

Albert Banard LAMM and Roy Lee
Lamm. Defendants and Appellant.
No. 15888"
Supreme Court of Utah"
Jan" 16, 1980"
Defendants were convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, G" Hal
Taylor, J", of theft by receiving, and they
appealed. '!'he Supreme Court, Hall, J",
held that evidence was sufficient to establish each element of offense charged, which
was based upon alleged concealing or aiding
in concealment of stolen property.

Affirme<l"
Maughan, J., dissented and filed opin-

ed •'qually rrnd on the s<ime basis as the

old residents""' [Emphasis added"]
I am not un'Symp.J.thetic to the needs of
the cities in our State faced .. ~·1th dramatic
expansion I J.m constrained. however, to
rt·\'lew their ordinances with sensitivity to
both the constllul!onally protected rights of
proµerty ownt_·rs anJ the l1m1~ing nature of
the :-itatutory granb of pov. er to those
1'1t1es
And thdl sensit11;1ty enmpe!s :i. \1ew
un my part that the Ord1n::i.nct· is 1n\·al1J
38.

fd

..1t

I. Criminal Law <>=1159"2(7, 9). 1159.4(:!)
It is exclusive function of jury to 1t..·e1gh
evidence and to determine credibt!ity of
witnesses, and it is not withm prerogative
of Supreme Court to substitute its judgment for that of fact finder; Supreme
Court should only interfere when evidence
is so lacking and insubstantial th:it reasonable men could not possibly have reached
verdict beyond reasonable <loubt.

2b Ut3h 2d 2\8 4-87 P ::'.d 868
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,".1:::~. ~uch
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~t·r·, ncs. ·.he :iature dr

'h: ['1-..1::.lUn Tl1e D1·:1s1on's ex1st7 out nowiiere
3 ntiteU 1n 1he ::it..tl ...:'es
·.~e 01\151(Jn grantt:d :ne r:gnt :o litigate
tJ 1JWn n<1me or Jthen•,:1se. or. s1gn1fi~ 5 ,,f

·,
I

1

1

to .iµpeai Order.- ui ~he Comm1ss1on.

believe that, absen~ express statutory
/ Jhonty granted by the Legisiature, the
~ .~swn of Public Ct1lit1es has no st.anding
·, lppeal Ortlers of the P'JDlic Service Com~ s.;1on. Indeed, ~he im;:i:1cat10n of Section
-1-13 is that the Div1s10n on behalf of
:·e executive director of ~he Department of

equ.·.. 11·

J<Jl'.fHc;

l:tah

12'> 7

dt>r: :o ied1cate 7~ of ~,ro,,,Jn :and to city or :o t)ay
r ·_h;.i.t •:alue in cash to l:i.: J:>1..·d
'"t:-ol and/or park and recre::i.twn
1

··

ior

:acil1t1'-)
-:·~e Third District Court, .3<.i.lt
Lake l';Ju,-:·. David K. Winder, J., uphe!J
ordrnanc~ . ..i.nd subdiv1ders appealed.
The
Supreme r\"Jrt. 606 P.2d 217, affirmed J.n<l
remanJed.
On reheanng, the Sut-ireme

Court, \.\'1i'...1ns, J., held that ordinance was
not uncon::.tltut10nal on its face, but coulrl
not be applied without subdiv1ders being
gwen the opportunity to present eviJcnce
to show that dedication required of them
had no rea....;onabie relationship to needs, 1f
any, for flood control or parks and recreation facili~ies created by their subdivision.
Reversed and remanded.

13,.siness Regul.:ltion, is charged to execute
1nv rules, regulations or orders of the pub-

/

'1~ ~rvice comm1s~1on of

Utah issued pursuqua.si-Judicial or rule-making pow~r · ThL'i Court should not allow the Divi',"n . .1nd particularly in the absence of a
~e:~n1li\e grant of authur1ty by the Legisladnt to its

·m. ~o J.ssume the ~ension-filled role to.qrd the (\1mmiss1on of both investigator, 1~forrer and adversary

1

1. Municipal Corporations =122(2)
Once it is determined that municipal
ordinance is within the scope of powers

granted by the legislature, the ordinance is

entitled to the presumption of constitutionaJ validity accorded other legislation.
2. Zoning and Planning <>=61. 134
Oniinance which required subdividers

John CALL and Clark Jenkin.,
Plaintiffs and Appt>llants,
(!TY <Jf II EST JU RDA,\.. Ut~h.

Defendant and Respondent.

:"Jo 15908 (Rt'hearing).
Siipr<'rnt- C'uurt of l'tah
Jum' ~- 1980
'·jt ..

1

•

.ict1un ti) challt''l~e
.1·1!1r.:.rnct: Ail'1~1tPd by l'l~'l' ·.vh:1'h

':t-r::. hrriu~ht

I nJIPJ

'"7

)/,Hn

>mt'lt1n,; . .'<er1n1n~

l'l.Jh Pn\\ n " L,gh C,1 S~
p gn~ 11g2!1
t1Jh L,i..:ht &
P11/;/1( S,·n" t ' ' .1mn1.,·>10111 •J;

to dedicate 7% of propvsed subdivision land,
or pay equivalent of that value in cash, to
be used for flood control and/or park and
recreation facilities was not unconstitutional on its face, but could not be J.pplied
without suMiv1ders being gi\'en the opport'..::t1~·. tv
l~:'"'lt 'c": ·:-.';ti.'.<;' 1:0 ~~')"' '.'.1 l:
re11uircu of (ht:m h<!U :-io n.:~onu.
ble relat1unsh1p to needs, if any, for flood
control or parks and recreation facilities

d~d11.:J.LJOn

created b) their subdi\ is10n.
3. Zoning and Planning C:=>234

If subdivJ::>ion generates need for flood
control or parks and recreation facilities
and municipality exacts fee in lieu of deJ16.

Sec11on ) t--1 -6
5<o'efoo!note2,supr-:J
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cat10r. ni ;..J.rd [,)r :5-uch purposes, :"ee:collecr..ed must be used m such

.l

way

J ....-,

benei!t demonstr:ihly the subdi\ 1s,on
question, though t!ie benefit need not h>"
solely to ~he particular subdivision.

Robert J. DeBry and Vaiden P. Li"ingston, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and .'-~
pellants.
Lynn \V. Mitton, Sandy, for defendant
and respondent..
WILKINS, J ust1ce:
This matter IS again before us following
our granting of plaintiffs' petition for

rehearing.

The original majonty opinion

addressed primarily the issue of whether
there was statutory authority for the City
of West Jordan to pass an ordinance requir-

ing a subdivider to dedicate land or pay a

fee in lieu of dedication as a prerequisite to
approval of the subdivision pla.t. 1 This issue was decided by the majority in the
affirmative. 2 On rehearing this Court limited the scope of review to the issue of
whether the ordinance in question 1s constitutional, and therefore we address only this
matter now

SERIE~

.,..... .:::.nt,' l hy ~n., eg-is1atur1'-,,
q1.n1on of '.h1:-i ('uurt ;n111,
'-ll lhe
>rr~:nance 1n q11t':::.t1on ·,.1..:a.s-·.,,.· n~.' ( p :s
t>nt1t.eJ to lhe presumption .;f, 1l,1~~1Lut1on1I . al1dity accorJed other !e~->ut.un J In
this case, the District Court ruled ~n.it the
ordinance was const1tut10nal and therl!fore
granted West Jordan's motion to J1~m1ss.
1

(2, 3] While we agree that the ordinance
not :.rnconstitut1onal on its face.~ plaintiffs raise questions as to its const1tut10na!ity as applied to them which make disposit10n of this issue as a matter o: law inappropnate. We staterl in our prior opinion m
this case that "the dedicat10n should have
some reasonable relationship to the need
created by the subdivision." s This same
requirement has been articulated m the de·
cisions of other jurisdictions addressing this
issue. In Jordan v. Village of Jfenomonee
Falls,• the Court held:
lS

[l] Once it is determined that a munic1pal ordinance is within the scope of powers

We conclude that a required dedication
of land for
park or recreational sites as a condition for approval of the
subdivision plat should be upheld as a
valid exercise of police power if the evidence reasonably establishes that the municipality will be required to provide
more land for
parks and playgrounds as a result of approval of the
subdivision.

The ordinance m question in pertinent part
reads as follows:

P 2d 1150 (1976), I R Anderson. Amencan
Law of Zoning 2d ( 1977), ~ 3 23

I.

Section 9-C-8(a).

In add1t1on to all the

'1'.,"!r r~~·11r"!rr> .. rH~ preo;cnh"!d ·Jr.C':'r this Qr·
Ji.-id.11ce- ·.!1e '"hd1vr'J~r ::.n:i.11 ,·Je ~e·~· :ro::!C :o
...!edit...ite t..he scv~n IJ<:f cent 1 i'''QJ or tne land
area of the proposed subd1\lls1on w U'1e public
use for the benefit 3nd use of the c1t1zens of
the City of West Jordan
or in the
alternative at the opuon at the governing

4.

deems advisable

3.

C.l.il v

City of West Jordan, Utah.

Crestnew-Hollari.11
Homeowner~
As.;;oc1Jlion, Inc. >' Engh Floral Compan.>. l_'tah. 545

~ucc:1rictr."'~S

1.1 JL.<'1,-1•

:n •hi"' 1nf!

'f n1,

"~-,ni•

442 (l965l: .4.ssoc13lt'd Home Builders v Cir\"
of Wa/nur Creek. 4 C.il Jd 1'311. 484 P ::!d 006. ~4

606 P 2d

217 (1979) In Call I, the author of this opinion
ftJed d dissenting opinion. 1n which Justice
Maughan concurred. and which conc 111ded that
there was no statutory J.uthonty for the ordi
nance m question

1•_.11-J.~

be J~sir.ib!e ..:1nd c~-rt:.unly 1:::. .iµp1<'Ua«-t1 :tie
ordinance in question when compared with
similar pro\llsions from other iunsd1cuons evi·
dences J. p3ucity of stated pun:ioc:.e and stan
dards of appl1cauon l.hat borders on rendering
the ordinance unconstitutmnally vague See. e
g. the ordinances quoted 10 Jord:m ,. Village of
Menomonee FdlJS. 28 Wis 2d >308. 137 >J '.V 2d

body of the City, the City may accept the
equivalent value of the land 1n cash 1f 1t

2.

\Vhde i..,,.,.v\t\· :ind
1ng >t

Cal Rptr 630 \1')711.

HomP 8uJ/Jns .\srnc1d·
iri, ,)f l\Jns:is

t..ion Qf Gre:Her KJnsas L.t\ " L
Ci£}, 555 S W :::'J ')J2 , .\1o i •_1771

5.

fi06 p '.:d

6.

\\11s 2d
\ J '.171)
~S

3l

.:20
t.i11R

·.ilS, !".!7 '..; ".\' 2J 44.2 . .p-.;

oiT.HE, ET<

'·

l"T~H ~IERIT SY~TD! l'ilC~CIL

Utah

C11f' ;1:.., Utah. 614 P 2d 1259
•1

~·.,
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,lf,,,-ne Bu1i,-f~ ..-.::. -l.. 'e!•H''.;.l;ur: of

"!\,b

City

\~1-.,sour1

i.

C.t_',

Suprµm~

rJf

i{J.nsa.:;

1~,1urt

n~id.

if the hurden ,·ast 1Jµon the
der :s reasonably ;:it.tnbutable to
1, Hl v1ty, then the requirement (of ded-

in lieu thereotl 1s perm1ss1·f nut. ,t lS forbidden and amounts to
,nf1.5cat10n of pnvate property in con·.r~'entwn of the constitutional prohibi·1rins rather than reasonable regulation
·.Hider the police power
Insofar as the

Jl,Jr ·)r fees

1P,

i

t1'>tabl1shment of a subdiv1s1on within

STATE of l'tah. By and Through the DEPART~lE:";T IJF cmtMU~ITY AF·
FAIRS, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

UTAH ~1ERIT SYSTDI COUNCIL and
William A. Callahan, Defendants
and Appellant.
No. 16501.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 3, 1980.

a

cit\ increases the recreational needs of

t.h~ c1t_v. then to that extent the cost of
that increase indeed may reason1bly be required of the subdivider. (Emphasis 1n original.)
71 eetln!f

\n this case the rule adopted by this
1n Ca1/ I, quoted an le, cannot be
1cpl1ed without plaintiffs being gwen the
0:.iportunity to present evidence to show
·hat ~he rledicat10n required of them had no
·~asonable relationship lo the needs for
::ood cuntrol 0r parks and recreation facili:1~~ created bv their subdivision, if any.
:mp!ir1t 1n this. rule is the requirement that
f :he ~uDdiv1s1on generates such needs and
West .Jordan exacts the fee in lieu of dedic.atton, 1t 1s only fa1r that the fee so collect:d be used in such a way as to benefit
'kmonstra.Uly the subdivision in questi~n
Th1'.> is not to say that the benefit must he
'0iel.1' to the particular subdiv1s1on, but only
'.hat ~here be some demonstrable benefit to

1 1 0Urt

, , ir~ ,nd,.,tJ .-'Jr •ur:hPr 1Jro1ot 1neon81stt:nt with this vp1mon.
~.n<I

.. t-d1n~
•'HJ

uJ:-.l::.

.twarded.

\ROCKETT, C J. and :-!Al.!GHAN,
Y.\1.L 111•1 STEWART, JJ, concur

State sought review of a decision of the
Merit System Council ordering the reemployment of an employee of the Department of Community Affair.i. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal
Taylor, J., reversed, and remanded to the
Council to hold a new hearing. Employee
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J .,
held that the exclusion of the director of
the Department of Community Affairs
from a portion of the administrative hearing because she was a witness in the proceeding was revers1b!e error an<l the attendance by a deputy director, who directed
another arm of the operation and lacked
full knowledge of the case, was not sufficient to provide the Department with appropriate representation.
Affirmed.

I. Officers and Public Employees =72(1)
Both ;;a.rt:~.~ tu µroc"-'e·iing lwf1)rt• '\1er:t
System Cour.ul wece en;:.1:.led t.11 ha.e tc:sttmony taken under oath or affirmation .
2. Officers and Public Employees =72(2)
Failure to place witnesses before Merit
System Council under oath was not reversibly erroneous where no objection was
raised until State sought review of C.Ouncil
order in d1stnct court.
3. Officers and Public Employees =72(2)
Omissions from record of proceeding
before \.1ent System Council were not re-

•

•

PETERSEN. SORENSEN & GROUGH
::(Allfl(O

?\JB~IC

ACC'JUNIAN1S

M(MBUfS OF
AM(~ICAH tNSTITUT( OF
C(IHlfl(D P\JSUt ACCOUNTA.NT'S

Sep lcmbcr

UTAH ASSOCIATION OF

I 'Ji; 1

1 1,

CCRT!Fl(O PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

Thirj Ju,~i,: ,,\\ ~ ·
Of Salt L3'c (,,u11t,
For The State Of UtJh
RE:

ORDER AP?Ol~TING ;•ASTERS, Civil No. C-?U-1129
JOHN CALL A~O JOHN CLARK JE~K!NS - PlJnt1ffs'
vs.
CITY OF WEST JOROAll, UTAH - Defendant

Sir:
As the appointed master of the court

in

the above referenced proceeding,

have completed a sur•1ey of the available accuunting records at the City of
West Jordan.

In accordance with this order, the purpose of this survey was

to determine if the City's records could provide informotion as to: (1) the
amount of consideration paid by various '"'"livHl<·r' rrl.1irrl tn thr cily'•,
Flood Control ancl "Mk Fee OrdinJnCP, (2) wh.it lhc city d1u with each fee

this information from the City's records.

This preliminary report presents

the resul :s of .my survey

~(COUNTING

RECORDS AVAIL\RLE

For each of the f 1sea1 ycJrs ending June Jll, !97S through 1978, the
following records were available:

(l) general ledgers, (2) cash receipt

journals. iJ) cash d1sburserrcnt Journals.
coinple:e recorJs

ke~t

These lecgers and journals are the

by the City and it appears that no records are missing.

APPENDIX "D"

/

During fiscal year eccicg
account~~g

s;stern.

as the prior hand

ih1s
~cs

~cce

10, :g->

- n "•",

5>/S~L·~ ;:JrJ·,~~r.:s

ted

The C :ty has 'JSed a series cf accc;un:s

for flcod CJntrJ1 and pan fee transactions

f,

1

tl-iin the

~cner"d

I fL1nc

Flood Control Revenue
EXPEND !TURES

Flood Control
Parks
Equipment and Operating Supplies
Darks - 3uildings and Grounds
?arks
Sundry Charges
?arks
Land PurChdSCS
?an: s
lrnprovcments ()th er ThJ n 8u1ld·n~s
PJ rk s
~quireient
?a rx 5 - Profcss1ona1 Serv 1 ces

-

For fiscal ;ears 1s-:i and 132J "1e follpwing accounts were usea.
RECE:PTS

rlcod
Flood
;load
Flood
:-, ood
•1 oc:J
Flood
Fl ooc
Fl ocd
r: ood

~nt

c

::in:,...~~
- Sa'a.,es
Control - 3enefi ts
:cn t r'J I
Pub I 1c .'Jot ices
Travel
Contr:ii
::nt:~
E~'J iprner"1t and Su L' ;· : es Ma 1ntenance
Pnfess iona I )erv 1(~':
:ont:~
Cunt . . ~~.
'11scellaneous Su;;o 11 es
·:ontrol - '·~ isce1 laneous Ser·1~ce-:
·.... 3 nd .i:c.::{uisit1cns
': un t ,...'J l
: ~r;: :· ') ~
! -on •e"len ts Ot 'le,... - h:! n 3 J 1 I G ·
1

1

cc:::~;:

ine fol low1n<; accoun::. were

RECE!?TS

Flood

~o

u:e~

I

I

..

/

tne 1ac-e h:ount1 were u1cd year to year except in 1979 and

:;c::

t·,e

e'~end;ture

ac:,Junts

~ere

SURVEY

ai I under the general account title of

~ORK

PERFCRMEJ

ri·'.h ao Jr.Jers'.Jnd·r; Jf the accounting records available and the accounts
~sed

'Jr '.he

' 1 ~Jd

cJntrol trin1Jct1ons, I selected a few transactions for revie·

back to supporting docur:'cnta t ion.
are presented

The transact ions

reviewed and my findings

~clow

Rece1pt1

7/25/77

28, !41.89

GENERAL LEDGER POSTING

7h1s transaction

Wd S

traced back to two ca sh receipt documents

as follows:
7/20/77
7/20/77

Clark Jenkins
Ensign Dev.

16,576.00
11,565.89
~

Wes Cal 1
Bunker Hil 1

28 !1 l 82

Ca1h receipt doc umcn t 1 we re found and I traced this amount to a
:ia n k :•eck'ng ac:Junt deposit.

hoend1

t~res

)/:: ·7

CHE:K NO. 3152

NE:LSEN, .'o1J\XWELL & WANGSGARD

s

1.168.21

~c is ~ 3 yrrent was traced back to supporting invoices from Neil sen•

"axwe" ~ rlon;sgard.

s:: .. ., ::;

J"~

'\

The ~1.168.21 is part of a total payment of

supported Jy the following individual invoices:

•

'1

4 Ill, 73

1.

2.
3.

'...Jes: JordJn - S~ur"'

1.

"l~1:

-lill1amsburg Subd1·11s1on - uea dra~r.a~e s :u dy
Browns Meadow - area dra ·nage stud;
•
Area # 's 5 and 6 - area dra inaqe s tuoy
Cost Summar;.
Engineer 18.J

3/10/7tl

:>J

CJntract - Project ·~J~ber ~26C-6J

~rs.

\.lest Jordan - Stonn Ora inage
Contract 5860-63
'-lill iamsburg Suodi·1is:on - area •fra:nage

st~cy

Cost Summary:
Engineer l.5 hrs.

4/11/78
1.

'li

?roJect Number 53;3.53
?rofcssional engineering services for constrvct1or
surveying and inspection for the 27GO ~est Storm
Ora in Project
Cost Summary:
ProJect Inspection
Sur·1eyor
Technician
Travel
s

28 hrs.
20 hrs.
2 hrs.
31. 64

7"

162

2.

5/18/78

NOLAN & SON

CHECK NO. 3163

s 10.000

00

This check is a partial payment on a total invoice of Sl9,644.61
related to installation of the 2700 \.lest storm drain.

3.

5/31178

NICK J. COLLESSIDES

CHECK NO. 3260

S 472.00

The $472.00 1s part of a total check for Sl, 172.00.

$472.00 was

traced to a supporting invoice related to legal services on the CAL.
ct , a l . vs . -I e s t Jordan ca s e .

4.

11/22/76

CHECK N0. J889

T~NNESEN

This trJnsJctions wJS traced to

J

sprirklinj systems as follows.
~3r~est

Estates

CJ:ce 'lallc1 No

~;c

SPR!NKlE~ CCMP:~i
sL1~rort1n1

invoice for

11

,;

••1...:..:-

.
111 ~apect

11

"

fJr 3

::;f ryround dt Sl0,000 per acre.

iC'eS

•:is '.S. 371 acres at 7000 South, 3200

0 r:~er'.; ~·Jrcnase

'~est.

The total
A second

c1ec< for the '.la lance Jf $73,710.00 ·-ias Pdld on the same date and was
charged to tne PJrKs - Land ?urchdses account.
Conclusions
.1;:0 the ·1ndc:-1tand1n~ I gained from the sample tests above, [can

dra·" '.he '~l10·,,1n'J conclJs1ons about t11c rest of the work tl1e court has
rcqucstec·
C11h recci~ts Jrc ;cncrall; ·ldcr,uately cnc11mcnted, and [can determine
from the existing accounl1n~ records the individual contributions made
by each subJiv1Jcr.

2.

In or~cr to dcterc1111~ tile •,iay the City l1Js spent eacli individual subdivider'
fees, I ·-ii 11 need to

I ,,,11

1

~erform

the fol low1nn steps:

need to ce'.er-;oinc Hhat each of the individual flood control and

parks disburcsrnents ·,1cre for.

Fror. the sample tests above, I beleive

tnJt t11e trrnsJct 1cns arc 1·1el I Jocu"1ented .ind that I can determine the
purpose of eac'1 j:scwrsement.
S'.eo_l

-

~fter

I w!ll

I find a general description of the transaction provided in Step 1,
oonj

tJ jeter"line

~no

benefited fro01 each individual trap52ctjqo

r ron the sanplc '.ns'.s above, I know thJt often the accounting records do
nc'. --:·11:e an e':'JnJtion of the indivirlual benefits to subdividers.
:.cc iccount 1n9 recJrds. I have no way of kno>iing who
~l·-~·

:._•J

fn:c :c.c ~:c,:;co pJyment for the 2700 West storm drain.

:»!cr..,,nc !h•.'

nc'1":ual sJb.Jivider's Lcncfit from this type of

To

I

I

:ra~sact

~11,

ind1vld:...al

..,·

SJ("]d~./,.:2rs,

nc,,C'-1'.::r,

.Jr'_

1

sc.::.,ec~ive

J,

.:t:c~':..11.n"", 'riC'~

J.n anJ1_1s1s ,·10_..l,j :-~G'J~re J r;: ,·,e,.-1 ~t
1

fisca: year.

'"~1';d1v1dP,...

r,...,

''O

From SteJS 1 ancJ 2 I ·•111 have an undcrstJnring of ·•hat

al~

the f'cc:

1 r j i .'

11i1..J

3.

il

:JJ

not Oe1e1,1e

~r,jt

~

...,n,;i

pyl""''"O"

I

\st~;-;c:r~ro~

{

S'.ep

and J2r·ks

~ransactions ~ere

;or anrl wno benef1ted from them.

requires additional depth in the benefit analysis because the

Cit; >i1s spent cic:1ey for flood control .ir1d oarks that has cor1e fror.
sources Jther than Flood Control and Park Ordinance fees.

Tnese other

funds can come from Federal or State sources or from general tax revenue:
FJr clarification

in

lJnguage, I will CJll these other funds "ger.eral

c1'.y fJr.ds" Jnd I will call the Flood Control and Park Ordinance fees
"f 'ooa control fees".

T>ie City has not segregated funds fr:rn tr.ese t·e1·c

sources, therefo•c, the accounting records 80 rot ref1ect
money is being •Jsed w11cn a disburse"Tient 1s being rnade.

~h1ch

source

The prob 1em at

City funds and that '.his benefit is not pro;erly considered as part of•·
bencf1: the C1t1 's responsible to provide 1nd1vidual

s~bdiv1=ers

fer

(:lote that :;tcD 2 nas given the suDd>viders

C''

for the bene•·:s '.rom tcese general Cit1 funds.)

port1Jn of a sut.:JJ,',d~r's tJtal benefit_

1

,t-rryn

~te:J :

1

wJs ~r:i-11Ced from

;

•

I

·r-,1)

•

le}.;(' or;i ~i1 1_· pure flood control benefit for

NI

CJn'.rJl and Jar' '.ransic:,on ana ~roJect. Since this information is not
prov1ced 'n the ex·,st1ng :iccounting records, 1t will have to come from other

L

recJrds and, agiin, from the help of a trained engineer.

It is also possible

that such 1nhrmation may not be available at all for some transactions,
therefore, the analysis woula not be possible.
PROP:RTY RECCIVEO AS FEES
The City has on occasion received ~roperty as a fee from the Flood

Control and Parks Fee Ordinance.

These transactions are not recorded in

the accounting records of the City but are recorded in the minutes of the
City.
order.

I reviewed one of these transactions and found it to be in good
I did not, nowever, attempt to follow the transactions past the

entry in the minutes.

I should be able to follow these transactions into

recorced deeds and perform procedures similar to those provided above.
COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNIFORM MUNICIPAL
FISCAL PROCEDURES ACT FOR UTAH CITIES

The court ·was son;ewhat confusing in it's instructions related to my
determination of west

~ordan

City's compliance with the Uniform Municipal

Fiscal Procedures il.ct for Utah Cities (the Act).

Paragraph 2 of the order

which stated "The .rnster shall report to the court as to whether the documents
are being kept
accounting

in

accJrdance with Utah Fiscal Procedures Act and general

princip~es" ·~JS

striken from the work I was instructed to do.

However,

Paragraph J st3tes chat "If the documents are not being kept according to regular·
establis'e·j accJunt1c9 principles in accordance with the Fiscal Procedures Act,
the

~.1:'.e>·

:r·ai· ''s:

es~imHe

che cost of the report had the records been prepare

7:

cording to gene r 3 l 1 y Jc : :: ~ : =·j J:: : : t.. n t
e Fiscal ?rocecures

~::

-

·

r

es

' n~

~,e

compliance in these t1-.'0 o rea s.

present 0nly my opinions cela:ed '.J the Ac:.
First, Section 10-10-29 FUND: TO 2E

EST~JL!SHED

of the Ac: states that

"Each City shall maintain, ac:Jr:ling to its owr. "eeds, some or al 1 of the f:1·.
funds or ledgers in i:s system of accounts

of the rrun1cipalit;."

.<est Jordan City did no'. 'llaintain a property ledger

until recenti;, however, within the scope of tnis scrvey

ccui d not deter1nr.e

its accuracy related to prior transactions.
Second, Para9raph : 2) of Section 10-10-29 al so requires a City '.o ma ·:n:a
"Special revenue funds, as required, such as

·

fund financed by a special-pur;c

tax being earmarked for a specific purpose", and paragraph (4) requires
capital improvement funds to otherwise account for funds allotted
specific

ccnstr~ction

proceeds of

g~neral

annual~/

t:

or improvement projects derived from sources other that·

obligation bond issues or general long-term debt."

Neither of these pacagraphs are exactly related to the
of flood control an: pu'<s fees. '.owever, I think that they

acccun~'ng ~rcbie-

bot~,

provice ;u'.'.'.

on the proper me:hod of recording these transactions.

First, while these fee'.

may not be taxes, '. :h'.rk :hey are ,.,1tnin the '.heme of

paragra~r.

'::; in tha'.

they are for a special purpose and ecr111drkcd specifically for that

pur~ose.

Secondly, these fees "e"': :Jl'ec':ed 'or flood control and parks ccnst:'Jctic",
improvement projects, therefore, Jaragrapn (4) '.eems to apply.

recorded these

t:3nsJ=~

not given them spec'.a·

·:ns as ;ear-tJ-fear
a~:ount'.rg

treatwent.

revL'l'.J~

3nd

ex

~he

pen·~~ ~ ...

City has

·-es ai;d

,ra~

I

-

~

'

'
'

'ri':" :·e

]Ji~ir,~

"hat

:)nclu~e

t~e

•
(2), \·1) and (9) of Sections 10-10-29,

~Jra~ra~ns

d

fees should have had special accounting treatment.

First,

th;nk :he City :hculd ha·1e prepared a fixed asset ledger that recorded a
description of all 'cxed assets purchased, date of purchase, cost and any other
appl icabi e informa t on

This ledger should also have included the property

received as Flood Conni and PJrks Ordinance Fees.
Flood Control and
restric'.ed

e~u''.f

0

irks

r~e

Secondly, I think that the

receipts should hJVe been recorded directly into a

acc:unt within the general fund, which would represent earmar:

funds f)r flood control and parks.

As the City detenn1ned allowable uses for

these funds, they should have made a transfer from the restricted equity account
to a revenue account.

It appears that the expenditures have been recorded prope

This accounting method would have provided an equity account that reflected any
unused portion of these funds collected.

It would not however, require the City

to document the individual subdividers benefit from the expenditures or how his
individual funds were spent.

I cannot find any provision in the Act that requir

accounting records to be maintained so as to document an individual's benefit or
how an individual's funds were spent.
COSTS TIJ COt'cLCTE T:r[ crn:11:1AT!Oll

r can objectively evaluate the time necessary to analyze the receipts from
subdividers and '.he general nature of the total disbursements by the City.
have '.o "se

3

1ery sub;~c'.ive analysis, however, in determining the time necessa

to allccate the ~eriefits of al I costs to individual subdividers and to determine
an.y gcrenl obi 1~atcon benefit that I refcred to in Step 3 above.

For this reas

r must ~rovide the following very broad range of fees to complete this work'

Est

"'J ·.. J

Analysis of fees received
and the general nacure of the
disbursements (Step 11

3,700

Step

5,~C'.l

7,600

Step 3

S,GCO

7 600

12'~1'0
--

18,900

Total

cJNAL REPORT

If the court should request me lo complete this work, I will issue our
final report in accordJncc with

~tatcme~~u_<iiting

Special Reports

Upon Procedures to Specified Elements,

Applyi~~ ~~rc~d

Standards No. 35 -

Accounts or Items of a Financial Statement, issued by the Auditing Standards
Executive Corrrnittee of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
Because my "rocedurcs will not constitute J complete examination in accordance
with generJlly accepted auditing standards, I ,,ill not express an opinion on
the financial statements of the City.
procedures or if : was to

~erform

Also, if I was to perform additional

an audit in accordance with generally ac:eptec

auditing standards, other matters might come to my attention that I would report
to the court.
Again, it is a subJective matter of determining how much the above fee
estimates would :ie if tr.e records had been pre pa red in accordance with the
accounting methods ! have suggested in my corrmcnts related to comp I iance with
the Uniform Fiscal Prccedures Act for Utah Cities.

[t would obviously be easier

to find recorded proper'.; received for fees, and any unused fees cculd easily
be identified in total.

-:-nese records would cot help in the analyses of the

individual sub:Jividers becefit from expenditures

,)r

in deterr:i;nins how his

i

p

ind'

;~jua'

<='ee:. -,.,ere

s~ent

it appears reasonable that these records would hav

reduced t~e fees "bovc Jy 10 to 20 percent.
records for

eac~

ff the c1ty would have kept indivi

Subdi·11der on specifically how his money was spent or how he

benefited from Joint expenditures, then the above fees would have been reduced
substantially, but as r stated above, I cannot find a requirement that such rec
were necessary.
will be happy to discuss these matters in detail at the courts request.

1~,~~
Petersen, Sorensen

&Brough

BA:;BERRY DEV. CORP. v S<l\IT!-1 JORDAN CITY

Utah

Cite u. Ut..ah, 63 I P 2cJ 199

,(!erice, 1n my

:\e\v

0f mctrket value in

,_'3..'>e. Even if rt :ie conceded that the
plaintiff's out-of-court statement as to the
nlue of the well is sufficient to establish
lfP 1·aJue of the well, ~he testimony falls far
shurt of providing a reasonable basis for
Jeterm1lllng market value of the whole parcel without a working well. Surely in this
case such evidence would not have been
hard to come by
The point cannot be
avoided by the general principle that some
uncertainty in evidence of damage is to be
h1::i

expected. That principle has especial application in cases dealing with lost profits
because of lost sales, see Winsness v. J.U. J.
Conoco Distributors, Inc., Utah, 593 P.2d
1303 (1979); loss of good will; losses occasioned by inability to reduce unit costs; etc.
These types of losses inevitably are burdened with considerable uncertainty because of the nature of the factol"3 which
must be considered. Market value, 33 a
measure of damages, may give rise to conflicting testimony, but the basic factors to
De considered are not 30 difficult to evaluate. In- any event, there must be some
evidence of market value, and there is none.

HOWE, J ., concurs in the dissenting opinion of STEWART, J.

w.____,

o ~ ~ffllU,.CHSlSIE~

BANBERRY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, McKean Construction Company, Midwest Realty and Finance.. In~ a
Ft.1.h

corporation.

~ ",)7'1,; ... :1

t<i,

Plaintiff~

and

Re--

v.

SOUTH JORDAN CITY, a municipal corporation, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 16872.
Supreme Court of Utah.

June 3, 1981.
Subdiv1ders brought suit against city to
chall~nge the va!idity of water connection
and p:irk improvement fees 1mpose<l ~ a
condition to connection to the city water
main and a.9 a condition to final approval of

I

the .;;ubdiv1ders' plat. The Third District
Cuurt, Salt Lake County, Dean E. Conder,

899

J., 0>'JSt<..1ned validity of the park improvement iee, and granted city's motion i:.o dismts~ ..t.5 to 1t and held the advance collection
of w<.~cer connection fee contrary to statutory law and granted subdividers' motion for
summary judgment and both sides appeal-

ed. The Supreme Court, Oaks, J., held that
advance collection of water connection fee
from suOOivider and a park improvement
fee des16TI.ed to raise funds to enlarge and
improve sewer and water systems and recreational opportunities would be valid provided they were reasonable.
Reversed and remanded.

Howe, J .• filed separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which
Maughan, C. J., Joined.
L Water.i and Water Courses =-203(6)
Advance collection of water. connection
fee from subdivider and a park improvement fee designed. to raise funds to enlarge
and improve sewer and water systems and
recreational opportunities would be valid
provided they were reasonable.
2. Municipal Corporations ct:=712

Wateni and Water Counes C-203(6)
To comply with standard of reasonableness, a municipal fee related to services like
water and sewer must not require newly
developed properties to bear more than
their equitable share of the capital cost.s in
relation to benefits conferred.
3.

:"Y'l:unh~ipM.I C0r;ior:it~on!'

To dbt>rmine

c=.458

Sl1C\re 0: t:k
capital costs to be borne by newly deve!ope<.l properties, a municipality should de~q·J1:1bie

termine the relative burdens previously

borne and yet to be borne by those properties in comparison with the other properties
in the municipality a.s a whole and impor-

tant facton to consider include: (1) the cost
of existing capital facilities; (2) manner of
financing existing capital facilities; (3) relative extent to which newly developed
properties and other properties in municipality have already contributed to cost of
existing capital facilities; (4) relative extent to which newly deve!ope<l properties

I
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and other proper~.-::s in mun1c1pality will
contribute to cost v; ~'<:'.:it.mg caµ1t.al facili-

ties in the futur.:.::.

::. :::..:tent to which mu-

nicipality is requ1nn;; new developers or
owners to provide ,-,Jr-r::non facilities that
have been prov1ae<l Oy municipality and fi-

nanced through general taxat;on or other
means; (6} extraordinary costs in serv1cing
newly developed properties; and (7) timeprice differential inherent in fair comparisons of amounts paid at different times.
4. Municipal Corporations ~458
In determining reasonableness of a fee
for municipal services, courts must concede
municipalities the flexibility necessary to
dea1 realistically with questions not susceptible of exact measurement and precise
mathematical equality is neither feasible
nor constitutionally vital.

5. Municipal Corporations <0=> !67
Municipal officials must have legal
power to deal creatively with extraordinary
or unforeseen circumstances in provision of
municipal services.
6. :.funicipal Corporations <>= !22(2)
A municipality's exercise of its legislative powers is entitled to a presumption of
constitutionality.
7. Water and Water Courses <=203(12)
Zoning and Planning ~685
As the information that must be used to
a.Ssure that sudivision fees are within the
standard of reasonableness is most accessible
to the municipality, tha~ body should disclose
the basis of its calcu!at1ons to whoever
challenges the reasonableness of its subdivision or water hookup fees.
8.

~~·:it:C'f :\n<l W.lt,,.r Cours'?'"\ :;=.20~ll2)
Zoning and P!,111ning -:..:= 005
Once the municipality has di~c!o:;ed the
basis of its calculations for its subdivis10n or
water hookup fee:; to those who challenge
the reasonableness of the fees, the burden of
showing failure to comply with constitutional standard of reasonableness is on the
challengers.

9. Municipal Corporations <:3:=458
Park improvement fees should be fixed
so as to be equitable in light of relative
benefits conferred on, as well 3..'l relative

n:ur

.1. .::,

'""'''1·':'·l

i.-

..l

~·r~r·unt

rele\·:.i.nc

,\

nule ,H:';

sui'.',r1~r;

:iefits .ind buri?·~'1·

1,e1Pµed ind •)ther prop€n1t:,,

\!ichaPl J. \lazuran, Sal•" LL e
deft!ndant dOd J.ppelbnt

·:t:.'.

for

John H J.1cDonald, Cr:ug S 1 ~,~,
S.J.!t
Lake City, for plaintiffs a.nJ 1 L..:rirl".denb

OAKS, Justice·
This is a suit by three subd1v1deI'S clg'J.lnSt
a city to cha!lenge the validity oi water

connection and park improvement :·e€::1 1m·
posed ~ a condition to connection to the
city water main and as a cond1t1on to :·inJ.l
approval of the subdividt:rs' plat. At issut!
m this appeal are the legality of any such
fees, and, tf they are legal, t:-ie criteria for

judging their reasonableness.
The procedure for char~;mg the park improvement fee does not appear in the record. City Ordinance 13-1-5. which the subdividers concede was lawfully enacted J.nd
constitutionaJ, requires a subdivider who
desires to connect to the city water system
to enter into an agreement "spec1fyrng the
tenns and conditions under which the water
extensions and connection shall be made
and the payment that shall be required."
Paragraph 10 of thi:- agreement form J.dopt·
ed by the city and required of all suhdivi<lers before plat .i.pprova! obligates the ::>ubd1viders to pay th~ entire c0'it of ;\II watPr
including extens1vn::i irum e:<1::.t1r.g \Vater
mains and all connecting lines within the
subdivis10n. It a!so prcv1des th.:it "tht- City

shall charge the Applicant a cunnect1,1n :·ec
m the amount uf $_ _ for each individual dwelling unit to he ser.·eri wtth1n the
subdivision, which sum shall be pay:ihlt-> .n
full to the City before the ::..ufxli·:1:.1on ~:. .,_
tern is connected to any e'<1sl!ng City wat1>r
mains." The required crJnr:tod:1,n f'-'e "''a.:.
$800 for a 3/,-tnch line and '£1,001) !or ·1
l·1nch line

fl~NBERHY IJt.\

l'ClRP '· SOlJTH JO!WA:-. ClTY

(j(e-

'.;'hat 'tw •'(.flecr:un ,(

'•1..-

J"- ltJl'I, 6.JJ p 2d 899
•cl'

r

~ ree::i .n J.dvanct'. fr()m :he ~e ·~.
<>n:ot1tuttd .in unlawful ta{ a.nd _in
11n1 (\r1:-.t.lutlonal taking of r.>rrJµerty >nthu•1t
liul.:' ;·ruce::.s. the subdtviders sought in1unclJ\e r<:-liei They i:-hallenged the city's µark

fee 0f $235 per lot on the
They also attacked both fees a.s

~·wr0vemenl

~a.rne

basis

d1sc;im1natory.

Un motions in advance of tnal, the distnct court (1) sustained the validity of the
park improvement fee and granted the
c1~y's motion to dismiss as to it, and (2) held
the J.Jvance collect10n of the water connection fee contrary to statutory law, granted
the subdividers' motion for summary judgment, and pennanently enjoined the city
from its enforcemenL Both the city and
the subd1viders have appealed.

L
THE VALIDITY OF WATER
CONNECTION AND PARK
IMPROVEMENT FEES
[l] The district court ruled that the advance collection of the water connection fee
was rendered illegal by the combined effect
of U C.A., 1953, § 10-8-38 and § l 7-i>--22.
Sectwn 10--8--38 empowers the city, for the
purpose of defraymg costs of construction
or operat10n of a sewer system, to require
mandatory hookup and payment of charges
when a sewer is available and within 300
feet of any property containing a building
used for human occupancy. Section 17-6-22 provtdes that a municipal corporation
which contracts with an improvement distnct for sewage services shall !lave J.uthori;,) rr.J.he 5erv1•_·~ 1'har~ 0 ~ to p::i.rtit:.::i wh0
connt:L~ to 1W sewer system. If the mumcipd!1ty J.lso operates J. waterv1orks system,
the sect10n provides that these charges
"mJ.y be combined with the charge made
for water furnished by the water system
and may be collected and the collection
thereof secured 1n the same manner as that
3pe-cified 1n Sect10n 10--8--38, Utah Code Ann(1LateJ

1953."

HPc.au~ § 10--8-.38 does n0t authonze the

sewer connection fee in the
•lf vacant lots, and because § 17-&-22
p1 OVl(le~ that the city may cn!leLt water

th..Lrging of a
r:t:-,e

f,..,e._._. 1n t.he :>J.mt'. 'TIJ.nner as

Utah
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10-8-38 au-

for Lhe co1l"!'-t1on of sewer fees, the
comlirnat.J.on of rhe~e two ::;~atutes is urged
to forbid c1t1e::i f;qm co!!ect1ng water fees in
C\rcumstances no~ authorized for sewer
fees This does not fol\o·.v. Section 17-622 is perm1ss1v2, not mandatory. It poses
no statutory proh1b1t1on against the collection of a water connection fee from a subdivider for each lot in a subdivision at the
time the subdivision is hooked up to the city
water system.
~horizes

The validity of a sewer connection fee to
raise money to enlarge and improve a sewer
system was sustarned by this Court in
Home Builders Ass'n v. Provo City, 28 Utah
2d 402, 503 P .2d 451 (1972), discussed hereafter. In a decision issued after the trial
court acted in this case, we sustained a
municipality's power to withhold the privi.
lege o! city water service until a landowner
had paid a valid municipal sewer c.onnection
fee. Rupp v. Grantsville City, Utah, 610
P .2d 338 (1980). In two other decisions
issued after the trial court acted in this
case, we sustained a municipality's requirement that subdividers dedicate a portion of
subdivision land for recreational purposes
(or pay cash in lieu) as a condition of final
approval of their ~lat. Call v. City of West
Jordan, Utah, 606 P.2d 217 (1979). On
rehearing in this same case, we held that
the reasonableness of the dedication or ca.sh
requirement in a particular case was a ques-tion of fact that must be resolved at trial.
Call v. City of West JorWui, Utah, 614 P.2d
1257 (19~0)
Tht'se four Jet":31v;is ha1.e r~."01':ed the
legality of water connection and park improvement fees designed to raise funds to
enlarge and improve sewer and water sys-terns and recreational upportunities, as well
as the legality of conditioning water hookups or plat approval on their collection.
However, these decisions leave open the
question of the reasonableness of any individual fee charged or land dedication required
This question of reasonableness
must be resolved on the facts in each particular case. We therefore reverse both judgments and remand the entire case for trial
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Ctah

on the reasonablene:::is ,)[
has imposed in this c-ase.

~he

i<2eS the

·~·.t~:

IL
THE REASONABLENESS OF SUBDIVISION FEES IN GENERAL
Like so many other municipalities in this
st::i.te, the City of South Jordan confronts
the problems of providing a fast-growing
city with adequate services for water, sewer, recreation, and other common needs. In
1978, the city had to deal with the development of about 600 lots (including the -100 in
sulxHviders' development), up from about
65 in prior years. Snch growth puts a
severe strain on the financial and personnel
resources of a small municipality, and if not
properly managed could well overburden
common facilities like water and sewer to
the point where their service would deteriorate severely for the existing occupants and
be inadequate for the new ones. An appropriate_ way to provide adequately for such
services is by advance planning and financing.
The conventional means of financing municipal facilities ~e tax revenues, special
assessments, and bonding. In addition, in
recent years many local governmental '.JniU
in this country have employed subdivision
plat controls to require fees, such a.s the
water and park fees inYolved in this case,
that force developers to contribute to the
centralized capital costs of municipal serv1n

;..d.!it· n

to

t.:1.,.

c i;-"\'1:,··l!_

.,1.;;(i

eL':i!:..3 .... µµLe.'.lfi!e ::iol:::_, r_o t11e::·
velopment. The courts of this state and
others have approved the legality of such
fees, but are still struggling to define the
limits of reasonableness that must be imposed upon their amount. 1 Without legal
limits-imposed by statute or constitut1onsubdivision charges could easily be used to
avoid statutory requirements for bonding

!. 1c:,:,zu\

I.

J Johnson. ''Const1tut1onal1ty of Subd1vts1on
Control Exactions The Quest for a RJ.uonale, ··
52 Camell LQ 8iJ ( !967). Heyman & Gdh0ol,
'lhe Const1tutrnn<d1ty of Imposing Incre:1sed
Community Costs on New Suburban Restdems

restri ·
T:-":11,trl
resp~·~

wnu[,1

,[jtLJ'

'"':fl['

n

Because this case :s b~1r.~ remanded :·0r
trial, it is appropnat<:: :·or this Court to
e!.iborate on the constitutional standards uf
reasonableness that should gove!l1 the va!idity of subdivision charges such as these.

1~~~

' -, !ii!>

mun

:l/~i!

•'I

1

t' ;[~II

nary --:on1r.,.;

, ··:.,'\.le

..,t-t::d
"'•:::c ;na~t~rs

'.he
.:.'r 1
..:1ty's
;inu that :."e . . xce~~
1

~..il

~he

rng f~nll
The ·~it:.- :n:11nu1ns 1n its ),,..~fin
this C•ur•_ that the wale; :.::onnect:,•n :·i-.::::.
woulJ '..le u::ied r.o erilarge '..vater '..ne.:. .ir:d
Stora;;~ :incl pumping f3.c1iiues. :ir·:l ~he
park :rr!rro1,ement fees ·.>.·ou!d be ·..1;;t:•J ·,)
enlar-;~ .J.nU Jevelop city parks. The i-':ut:es
diffE:r ·Jn gf"lether such an intent w;i" J~
cured u~. enforceable restriction, :;uch .i.:.
depo~it to ..1. separate fund
These contentions, 3.ll relev:i.n t to reasonableness, ar~
matters f .;c consideration at trial.

The subdividers also argue that the water
connection fee cannot be impose<! on the
developer, but must be deferred for imposition on the tot owner or homeowner at the
time of hookup. We find this argument
unpersuasive. This is not a case where the
party burdened with the exaction will derive no benefit from it. 2 \\-'hen the subdivision is connected to the city's water and
sewer systems, the city must be prepared to
perform its services on demand, and from
that fact the subd1viders denve immediate
benefit. The provis10n of standby capacity
to a subdivision requires the commitment of
substantial capita!. The city does not have
to wait until someone turns on a tap or
flushes a toilet before rt requires participation in the cost of providing- its services.
Subject to the requirement.<; of reason:i.b!eness diseus~ed helow, a hookuo ff'e that
menl vi so:r;t: l-'"rt:un u; :.1e eu1ninun C..i.iJital
costs attributable to comm1tt1ng ser.·;,ee to
the lots in the subri1vis1on is valid. The
same is true of the park improvement fee.

The proceedings on remand 1n this case
wilt be governed by t\l.·o le:iding- dee1s1ons Jf
this Court, one rle3.ling with a municipal
ser-'ice that emµlnys an ~·:pensive central
Through Subd1 .. 1s10n E-.,ict1ons.
! I! 9 ( l %4)
2.

c.c .. - _]nd

l-.J11nr1 ,.,, 01:''!,,..r •

-;3 ·1 ile L J

,;,-p~,1

BANBERRY DEV. CURP.
Cu

a~

.c1l1l·, like '.vater or sewer, .\nr.I ~he )t.1er
1n ,l municipal service that ~mploys disi·enl:'d resources like recreational land.
Though the standards of rea~onab!ene.ss in
these 1" wo circumstances are essentially the
".>J.me, their application is somewhat differ.~

ent. The two different types of charges
will therefore be discussed separately

III.
REASONABLENESS OF WATER
CONNECTION FEE
[2] Home Bui/der.J Ass'n v. Provo City,
28 Utah 2d 402, 503 P2d 451 (1972), sustained the validity of a sewer connection
fee (in addition to the monthly sewer
charge) for each living unit of n~wly constrncted buildings connected to an existing
sewer system. The fee was imposed in
order to improve and enlarge the sewer
system. It was not a revenue meJl.Sure or
an assessment, the court found, but "a reasonable charge for the use thereof," as authorized by U.C.A., 1953, § 1()..8-38. Significantly, the $100-per-lot charge was derived by dividing the total number of sewer
connections in the municipality into the net
value of the sewer system, and the funds
obtained were to be restricted to the enlargement, improvement, and operation of
tbe sewer system and to the retirement of
indebtedness incurred: in its construction.
In approving the sewer connection fee in

Home Builders, this Court relied on Airwick
Industries, Inc. v. Carlstadt Sewerage Au: '":1,r :.:.

:,7

~; j

l1i7, ''.'..7'1 .\.:2-t d

t L 1 7')1

1. _._ ~.cit appro·, c::J a wnnectiun foe atr.ingement by which the capital and interest cost.8 of a new central sewage system,
although met initially by the actual users,
would ultimately be borne by all propert1es
bendited, including lands that were unimproved when the central expenditures were
ongrnally made. The municipality did this
hy including 12 part of its conne<:tion fee
what our Court charactenzed as "a sum of
money which would represent a fair contribution by the connecting party toward the
exP'f.!n3e theretofore met by others." 3
l.

v.

SOUTH JORD~'\ CITY

Uta.ll, 631 P.2d 899

Homf' Builders Ass 'n v Provo CJCY. 28 Utah
2d .:it 405, 503 P 2d at 453.
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The Home :-;;.. fer.; CJ.Se established the
principle upon ·::h1ch the reasonableness of
the water connection fee in this case should
be JUdged. The "fair contribution" of the
connecting party should not exceed "the
expense thereof met by others." Or, as the
:-.Tew Jersey Supreme Court held in a subsequent case, the rules governing the allocation of improvement costs between city and
developer
would ideally have been 9uch as to insure,
to the greatest extent practicable, that
the cost of extending a municipal water
facility would fall equitably upon those
who are similarly situated and in a just
proportion to benefits confel't'ed. They
should be sufficiently flexible to permit
consideration to be given to the fact3 and
circumstances of each particular case.
Deerfield Estat .., Inc. v. Township of E.
Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115, 286 A2d 498, 505
( 1972). Therefore, where the fee charged a
new subdivision or a new property hookup
exceeds the direct costs incident thereto (as
a means of sharing the costs of common
facilities), the excess must survive measure
against the standard that the total costs
"fall equitably upon those who are similarly
situated. and in a just proportion to benefit.3
conferred." Stated otherwise, to comply
with the standard of re88onableness, a municipal fee related to services like water and
sewer must not require newly developed
properties to bear more than their equitable
share of the capital costs in relation to
[.lj To di::termme the equitable share of
the capital costs to be borne by newly developed properties, a municipality should
determine the relative burdens previously
borne and yet to be borne by those properties in comparison with the other properties
in the municipality a.s a whole; the fee in
question should not exceed the amount sufficient to equalize the retative burdens of
newly developed and other properties.
Among the most important factors the
municipality 9hould consider in determining
the relative burden already borne and yet
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to be borne by newly develoµed pmperties
and other properties are the fodowing, sug·
gested by the well-reasoned .:luthorities cited below: (1) the cost of existing capital
facilities; (2) the manner of financing existing capital facilities (such a.s user charges,
speciaJ assessments, bonded indebtedness,
general taxes, or federal grants); (3) the
relative extent to which the newly developed. properties and the other properties in
the municipality have already contributed
to the cost of existing capital facilities (by
such means as user charges, 5pecial assessments, or payment from the proceeds of
general taxes); (4) the relative extent to

which the newly developed properties and
the other properties in the municipality will
contribute to the cost of existing capital
facilities in the future: (5) the extent to
which the newly developed properties are
entitled to a credit because the municipality
is requiring their developers or owners (by
contractual arrangement or otherwise) to
provide common facilities (inside or outside
the proposed development) that have been
provided. by the municipality and financed
through generaJ taxation or other means
(apart from user charges} in other parts of
the municipality; (G) extraordinary costs, if
any, in servicing the newly developed prop..
erties; and (7) the time-price differential
inherent in fair comparisons of amounts
paid at different times. Home Builders v.
Provo City, supra; Rose v. Plymouth Town,
110 Utah 358, 173 P.2d 285 (1946); Airwick
Industries, Inc. v. Culsta.dt Sewerage Authority, supra; Deerfield Estates, Inc. v.
Township of E. Brunswick, supra; West
P.lrk A .,..e., Inc. v 7,rvr.sh1p of C::enn. ~3
N ..,. 122, 22-1 .-1...~1 l llSiOO); Rut.1n £.sW.tt's,

Inc. v. Town of Belleville, 56 N.J.Super. 330,
152 A.2d 853 (App.Div.1959); Zehman C-Onstruction Co. v. City of Eastlake, 92 Ohio
Law AbsL 364, 195 N.E.2d 361 (Ct.App.
1962); Strahan v. City of Aurora, 38 Ohio
Misc. 37, 31l N.E.2d 876 (Ct.Com.Pleas,
1973); R. Ellickson, "Suburban Growth
Controls: An Economic an<l Legal Analysis," 86 Yale LJ. 385, 467--89 (1977); F
Michelman & T. Sandalow, Government in
Urban Areas, 533--36 (1970)
[4, SJ In adjudicating the validity of any
individual application of this standard of

rea.sonablent::~

."

rn un ic1pai 1 ~1._·-;
deal rea!1st1<-.J.,

: : t:,

tible of e-:act ~·'='
ematical equ.L11t_.

'l'

:_,t
~.~''ess;ir·

.t;''it1un" ~1ot oU!>'-' ,'-

P:-cc:se mac.r:.,, .1,•1thi:'r feJ.S1ble nur
const1tut1onally \ 1lJ1 · 4.1rw1ck lndustne3,
Inc.. \.'. C.ulst.1d: Sewer:Jge .-luthonty. supra. Z70 A.2.d ...i.t ~6. S1mdariy, mun1c1pa1
officials must ..llso have the lel;al power to
\"" .r.-·.'T'<-r'lt

deal creat1vel .. .,v1th extraordinary ur unforeseen circumstances :n the provision c)f
municipal services
Rose ~
P!_vmouch
Town, 110 Utah 358, 173 P 2d 285 1 1946 I
We agree with and adopt the :"Jew Jersey
court's ruling in Deerfield Estates, Inc. ,.

Township of E. Brunswick, supra, 286 .\.2d
at 507-508·
The rule we lay down must be given a
pragmatic application. Complete equaJi.
ty of treatment may sometimes be 1mpos.
sible, especially where a municipality has
followed no set pattern with respect to
past extensions. Nor should a· municipal.
ity be denied the right to modify an established pattern where altered c1rcum.
stances reasonably so dictate. Equality
of treatment may upon occasion be forced
to gwe way before some supervening
public interest.
But insofar a.s such
equality can reasonably be achieved this
must be done.

(HJ The required flexibility will be implemented by the presumption of const1tutional~ty incident to a municipality's exercise of its legislative powers. Call v. Cit_v uf
West Jordan, Utah, 614 P 2d 1257, 12.'>8
r1980):
rre~tview-Hnl!J1iay
Honit=-ownn-q
Ass':, J...._ • r''lj(n :-~,,r!! ,_~,
r·, .h ·-1.5
P.2d 1150 \197tiJ, Duw;;;e v. ::>•.de La.r.e: C1'y
Corp., lZl Utah 107, 255 P2J ~23 (19531.
Since the infonnation that must be used to
assure that sutxfr11sion fee~ are within the
standard of reasonablene~s :s must acce~si
b!e to the municipality, that body should
disclose the basis of its c.alc•Jlat10n" t...o .vhoever challenges the re.J.Sonableness ,)f its
subdiv1s10n nr hookup fees
Once th..it t'.'l
done, the burden of ".howing failure to comply with the ronst1tutlonal stanJa.rd rif '<'3sonab!eness 1n this matter is \ln tht:> t-'n.illengers Homf' Bu11rier.:; A-'>~ 'n uf 1 ;re:i.ter

BA:"H:C.R;CY DEV. CORP. v. SOL'TH JORDA"' CITY
Cite u .. Ut.ah. 6J I P 2d k99

'-'
',- _',i

v City ,f ;,.,,.,_,ds C1cy. \.1o., S55
3.'32 11977)
r~:t_..·

[\'

REASONABLE::ES~
IMPROVD!E~IT

[9]

OF PARK
FEE

In Call v. City of \Vest Jordan, Utah,

606 P 2d 217 (1979), opinion on rehearing,

oH P 2d 1257 (1980), this Court upheld the
validity of a city ordinance that required
subd1viden, as a condit10n of plat approval,
to dedicate certain proposed 3ubdivision
land to the city (or pay cash in lieu) for
flood control and/ or park and recreation
facilities. In remanding the case for trial
on the constitutionality of the ordinance as
applied (i. e., the requirement that seven
percent of the subdivision land be dedicated), this Court ruled that "the dedication
should have some reasonable relationship to
the need created by the subdivision." Id. at
1258. The Court quoted the following from

Home BuildeN Ass 'n of Greater Kansas

I

j
I

City" City of Kansas City, Mo,, 555 S.W.2d
B32, 835 ( 1977):
[l]f the bun.Jen ca!:t upon the subdivider
is reasonably attributable to his activity,
then the requirement [of dedication or
fees m !ieu thereof] is permissible; if not,
it is forbidden and amounts to a conltse.a·
tion of private property in contravention
of the constitutional prohibitions rather
than a reasonable regulation under the
poliCe power.'
Reasonableness obviously hold.~ the municipality to a higher standard of rationality
:n:~~ ·.:-, ... :'·t.:;,u1:-ement ~!lal ~t.5 actioris r..qt be
:.ru1::-..1.rJ ur ca!JnCiou.>.
Under the reasonableness test in Call v.
City of We.st Jordan, supra, the benefits
derived from the exaction need not accrue
solely to the subdivision (614 P 2d at 1259);
tlood control and recreation are needs that
cannot be treated in isolation from the rest
of the munic1pality. At the same time, the
htnefits derived from the exaction must be
,,f "rlemonstrab!e benefit" to the subdivi':JJOn

~

(Id_ .J.t 1259).

with water con~ection fees, the
Jmount of ;;uch exactions or fees should be
3Uch ~hat the burden of providing these
4_

Ci//,. (-,,.,,of West Jordan. 614 P 2d at 1259
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munic1µ..1.l ,..:rvtces "falls equitably upon
those "~ho dr~ similarly situated and in a
just proportion to benefits conferred."
Deerfield £:;,ta.tes, Inc. v. Township of E.
Brunswick, 60 ~ J. 115, 286 A.2d 498, 505
(1971). The measurement of "benefits conferred" may have a more significant impact
on the reasonableness of park fees than on
water connection fees. The central facilities that support water and sewer service
would generally confer the same benefit.s in
every part of the municipality, but the benefits conferred by recreational, flood control, or other dispened resources may be
measurably different in different parts of
the municipality. Park improvement fees
should thorefore be fixed so as to be equitable in light of the relative benefits conferred on, as well as the relative burdens
previously borne and yet to be borne by the
newly developed properties in comparison
with the other properties in the municipality as a whole. The fees in question should
not exceed the amount sufficient to equal·
iz.e the relative benefits and burdens of
newly developed and other properties.
The factors to be considered in the determination of relative burden are similar to
the factors discussed in Part Ill in connection with water connection fees. The flex:i·
bility to be tolerated within the presumption of regularity and the disclosure of the
basis of calculation specified in Part III is
also applicable to this type of subdivision
charge.
The ;11dl(ment.3 of tht tri.::il co1Jrt J.re reverstd in the aµpeal and the cross-appeal,
and the cause is remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
No costs
awarded.
HALL and STEWART, JJ., concur.
HOWE, Justice (concurring and dissenting):
I concur that the defendant city may
lawfully require water connection fees to be
paid at the time the main line running
through the subdivision is connected to the
city system and water is brought to the
edge of e.ach lot. I arrive at this conclusion

906
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in view of tht .::..~!".nrity invested in cities
and towns to "cons:ruct, :nainta.in and operate waterworl-;.~,' j 10-3-14 U.C.A.1953; to
"fix the rates to (~~ paid for the water use,"
§ 1~22; and to ''enact ordinances, rules
and regulations ::ir the management and
conduct of the ·.vat....:rworks system owned or
controlled by it," § Il}-7-14. It is not unreasonable to require payment of the connection fee when the water is turned into
the main line cot.:rsmg through the subdivision because at that time the defendant city
is obligated to furnish water to each and
every lot as requested. In order to prepare
to do this, the defendant city had to make
capital expenditures to enlarge its ca.pacity
so that it could meet the new demands to be
imposed upon it. I concur that§ 10--8--38 is
not a prohibition against advance collection.

I also concur with the cnteria of reasonableness contained in Parts III and IV of the

majority opinion.

I dissent. however, from the holding in
the majority opinion that the city may lawfully impose park improvement fees. I concur with the reasoning of Justice Wilkins in
his dissenting opinion in Call v. City of
West Jordan, Utah, 606 P.2d 217 (1979).
The imposition of the park improvement
fees is even more offensive in this case
since the city conditioned the furnishing of
water service to the subdivision upon their
paymenL To me the two subjects are entirely separate an<l I believe it to be an
abuse of the city's authorlty to own and
operate a waterworks system (a proprietary
operation) to use the furnishing of water as
l.::v~r.ige to cull'=" t f·.;~:3 !'or othe: •i;irebte,I
p:.;~o:se~

s.~cl 1vn

W-S-.36

1~1.~1ur.;:e.s ~1i:1c.:.

and towns to discontinue water ser.-ice to
premises where the sewer service charges
have not been paid, but I find no authonzation to also deny service until park improvement fees have been paid.
MAUGHAN, C. J ., concurs
of HOWE, J.

in

the opinion

8t"t",

Harper Ct:I.BERTS01'i, F,1 ,
,ne E:::.t.ate of Jo\ce K. (1,)!;.-.--~
:lnd ..Ls an indindual. Plaintiff 1.,,J ::.:--

1'1

.;,pnndt"nt.
v.

CONTINZ:"ITAL ASSL'RA.NCE COo!PANI'. a Tennessee corporation, Chira:?;o
Bridge and Iron Company Profit·Shar·
in~ Plan Trust. an Illinois Trust, Beth
Rowley Culbertson Conrad. an individu·
al, Loretta Culbertson, an individual,
Ricriard
Culbertson,
an
individual,
Chrystella Culbertson. an individual, and
Elizabeth Culbertson, an individual, De·
fendants and Appellants.

No. 17H8.
Supreme Court of Utah.

June 4, 1981.

·

Decedent's second wife brought action
as executrix to have proceeds of a profit.
sharing plan and certain insurance policies
awarded to decedent's estate rather than to
decedent's first wife as his designated beneficiary.
The Third D1stnct Court, Salt
Lake County, Bryant H. Croft, J., awarded
plamtiff proceeds of profit-sharing plan and
defendant proceeds of insurance policies,
and defendant appealed and pla10t1ff cross
appealed. The Supreme Court, j1aughan,
C. J .. he!rl that: fl) r1~fenrl3..,t 1,vas ,:..,•,t•,,,-1
it-shanng plan, interest lo ·.i. n1ch ·.e:->teJ in
her on decedent·s death, where di--cedent
neither changerl designated beneficiary not
as moving party in di\·orce action sought
explicit relinquishment of defendant's expectancy, and there were no broJ.r:i, comprehensive prov1s1ons in J~cree 0i Ji\0r('e
which could reasonabl:, be ronstrued ~ J.
relinquishment or waiver r1f any nr ..l!I expectancies, and (~) wnere ·ieeree of div.,r('I:-'
between defendant and <iec<:>dent 3.~ ht·r
first husband did not hy ·:w •.nms e.\µr.-~"-'':
terminate rleier.rlant', _,t .. L-, J..:l a !Jt::nl·l.-

"I~

P \CIFlC REPORTEK

~d

Sllt~H·nn,

.t"

·gn1ficant ~hat ~here 1s no 1ndicathe pro::--:cutor made any at-

~.1t

lhat :.:..ct :o ca.st any inference ,f guilt on the defendant. nor to
per;U<.1<1e the jury to du so.
,empl

[4. 51

0 u::ie

..\s a matter of protecting the pub-

lic 1nlerest, a prosecutor would ignore his
Juty 1f he did not take issue with a remark

he did not ::.olicit, that professes innocence.
!t was the prosecution's duty to clear up
d1screpanc1es manufactured by the defendint, so as to give the JUry full opportunity
for rleliberat1on without speculation.

The Jury and verdict are affirmed.
STEWART, J., dissents.
Dl'RH..\.;!, J., does not participate herein.

Timothy Ross LAFFERTY, Plaintiff
and Responden~
v.

PAYSON CITY, a municipal corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.
Timnthy Ro'3 LAFFERTY, Plaintiff
am.I .\ppt>ll:rnt,

fr1r 1njunct1on ctgainst :.ie1r
. ind

~·ur

Affirmed in part;
manded in part.

vacated and re-

1. )funicipa.I Corporations <:=>625
P.e.\::o.,.1hl~ charc-r f·)r a ::pf!cific 3ervice
1s t-iermt::-.,tti!c ,L.:. f,u111.(111'<:. µerr1111.

PA YSO~ CITY, a municipal corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.
Nos. 17534, 17536.
Supreme Court of Utah

Feb 17, 19B2.
Cit:. residl'nt brought suit for leclanthJ.t municipal impact and connection
re::;pt>f't to ne....,ly rieveloped propCrlJl's ·,i,·~_·re t:l.'<b that 1.\ere 1lleg3.I ,rnd dist1on

fPt:-, ,\1(.h

,:;f)-

restitution nf t""t-=_.., lit
had ~1d1d The Fourth District Cvurt. L't;..1.h
Coun':. r::;eorge E Ballif, .J, entered Jt..:dgment :n fa•1or of resident, as to 1mpac1 :"ee
and cit! appealed, resident's motion for
summci.r; judgment as to illegality of con·
nect10n fees was decided and re::l1dent ap-pealed The Supreme Court, Oaks, J ., held
that. 11) building permit "impact fee" of
$1,000 per family dwelling, rleposite<l in
city's general revenues, which ordinance
stated was necessary because of emergency
situation created by property development
within city limits, i.e., city needed additional
revenue to offset costs of necessary increases in municipal sertices, was illegal tax, and
(2) measure employed in calculating in·
creases in connection fees for water and
sewer sertices, i.e., expert evidence on unit
cost of water and sewer services based on
1979 cost of constructing expansioA facili·
ties needed in such areas, and measure em·
ployed in calculating increases in connection
fees for newly devdoped properties with
respect to electrical services, i.e., expert evi.
dcnce on unit cost of electrical services
based on replacement cost in 1979 of municipality'!; existinei;; electrical system, did not
achieve equitable allocation to newly <level·
oped properties of capital costs in relation
to benefits conferred.
forCt' ~. 'lt

,1,ir1

:iERlES

~·~r

wht:":-0-

as general fee that amounts to revenue
measure 1s not.
2. Municipal Corporations ~601.3
Building permit "impact fee" of $1,000
per family dwelling, deposited in city'::; gen·
eral revenues, which ordinance stated was
necessary because of emergency .:5ituation
created by property development within
city limits, i.e., city needed additional revenue to offset costs of neces!;ary increases in
municipal services, was 11l~ga! tax.

.".PPENDIX

"F"

LAFFERTY
3. '.\lunicipal Corporations

~=

v.

P \ Y~tl'\ CITY

rJ.-)6(1)

of fee .mµl)x' I to augment
general re\ enues is Uctcrmu~ed by 11:$ legal
V;;ilid1~y

status J.t time it is o::xacted, ,\ ithout regard

to how funds are lo.ter al\ucated or spent.

4. Judgment e= 186
Denial of motion for summary Judg·
ment on alleged facial invalidity of various
connection fees and putting city resident to
trial on reasonab!ene~.s of such fees was
correct procedure.
5. Municipal Corporations ~458
Factors to be considered in deterrr.ining
relative burden a!ready borne and yet to be
borne by newly developed properties and
other properties to assure that municipal
fees pertaining to newly developed proper·
ties do not require them to bear more than
their equitable share of capital costs in rela·
lion to benefits conferred are cost of existing capital facilities, means by whii;;h such
facilities have been financed, extent to
which properties being charged new fees
have already contributed to cost of existing
facilities, extent to which they will contribute to cost of existing capital facilities in
future, t:xtcnt to which they should he credited for proviJing common facilities that
municipality has provided without charge to
other properties in its service area, extra0rdinary costs, if any, in serving new property, and time-price differential inherent in
fa,ir comparisons of a.mounts paid at different times.
6. :\tunicipal Corporations e=>712
\V..tc~r.;;. and \Vater Cours .. s
:.:=>'._'.()~ft))
:1.Lun1c1µ<.u1~y h;i.s !;urden of J1:,(.'.1u .. 1ng
basis of its calculations to whoever challenges reasonableness of connection fees,
and its allocations need not achieve precise
mathematical equality.
7. Municipal Corporations <e=712
Waters and \Vater Courses c=203(6)
Measure employed in calculatmg increases in conne<:tion fees for water ,rnd
sewer services for newly developed properties i.e., expert cviJence on unit cost of
water and sewer services based on 197~ rnst
of constructing cxpan::i1on fJ.cil1t1es net'.dcd

tft"'3.S.

.Jil·"'-'

,lid

:iut

.U..:t1lt

''l ill c:q.i1L..ti cu:...b in rPIJ~,,,n ·

,u11;-crrea .\nere ,l :1..;ed \-nl, ,_, ,..
·· ..:.C:JJtlt>:S •)n r.ewl;. ,Je\ eloped ;..rr>~'e:-1" . n
,\·1lh1JU~ .1..Ssuranct' that :.uch cosb xr·re <.'lu1tahle 1n relation to benefits confi::rrt·d J.nd
in comparison with costs imposed 'Jn it n1::r
property owners in municipality
er':~0

8. Electricity

=

11.2(3)
employed :n calculat111g increases in connection fees for newly •ie\eioped properties with respect to ele<:tncal
services, i.e., expert evidence on unit cost of
electrical services based on replacement cost
in 1979 of municipality's existing electncal
system, was incomplete Wlthout inquiry into
factors such as how existing system was
financed, J.nd thus did not achieve equitable
allocation to newly developed properties of
capital costs in relation to benefits con).lea~ure

ferred.

Dave McMullin, Payson, for defendant
and appellant.
Ray M. Harding, American Fork, for
plaintiff and respondent.
OAKS, Justice:
This appeal concerns the legality of two
fees a municipality imposed on the construction of new homes.
In 1977, Payson City enacted an ordinance requiring the payment of an "impact
fee" of $1,000 per family dwelling prior: to
the lS:"uance 0f :my hutldin2 permit The
rJrd~nJ.r,1_e ~ ~JCC·I · h.t~ · :,.~ ', ..... , ,,.,,

n,_.r'

becau;;;e of J.n emergency ~1tuat10n creatt:'.il

by property Jevelopment w1th1n the cit;
limits; the City needed a.<l<l1t1ondl revenue
to oifset the costs vf the necessary increases in municipal services. This fee was in
addition to at\ other municipal fees.
In 1979, the City enacted other 1ffdtnances increasing the fee:3 the City ch,trged
for connecting resiiiencl'S to "ariuu:> c1l\'
serYices. The revised amounts included
$1.000 for :Se'.\er: :$-.J.50 for water ( :~-1n\·h
hookup), $250 for electnc1ty 1100 1mp ~L·r~
\·1ce~
Pl:i1ntiff La(fLr'./. J. ··it:. rL"·,11k!1t
1
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· hn ,q'I

,ir•·r1'

~le t:-irn11\'

J.nrl

1.... s1rerl ',u ('Onstruct

J.

~111-

the impact

:t:c

fees under prote:.:;t

J.r•1

11.g·,

~he ,~1lnnec:irln

p ..11d

then brought th1:- ,u1t for

:l

declaration :.~. ..:.t

these fet:;, were taxes that were illei;al lnd
discriminatory under the ;;;tate and fetter.'.ll
Constituuons, for an mJunct1on against

their enforcement, and for restitution •Jf
the >Z. 725 he haJ paid.

L THE IMP ACT FEE
As to the impact fee, the district court
granted plaintiff's motion for summary
Judgment, holding that the fee was discriminatory in its. imposit10n on new homeowners and not on existing ones, and lllegal as a
tax not authorized by law. In No, 17534,
the City appeals from that decree.
The d1str1ct court relied on Weber Basin
Home Builders Association v. Roy City. 26
Utah 2d 215, 487 P.2d 866 (1971), where this
Court invalidated an increase in a building
permit fee on the basis that it was an illegal
tax. The opinion notes that the purpose of
the increase was to obtain additional money
for the _City's general fund, into which the
proceeds were deposited. As in this case,
the defendant city contended that the additional funds were needed to finance impro\'ements in the city's water and sewer
systems necessitated by new home construction.
[1-3] Subsequent decisions have approvc'd connection fees or subdivision fees,
subject to the reasonableness limitations
discussed hereafter
Banberry Development r'orp ~·. ,C:outh Jnrrlan Citv, Utab, 631
P :..;,1 , :1 1 !'J~iJ. C•ll
('."ty ,:i- \V.,st .l•)'"Jan, Utah, tiOti P.~d 217 (1979); Home
Bu1i<Iers Association of Greater Salt Lake L
Pro< o City, 28 Utah 2d 402, 503 P.2d .!51
t 1972) But in each of these cases, the fees
wen:' imposed to finance a specific municipal service or capital expenditure. The
It appears from the C:ity's answers to interrogatories an-:1 requests for admissions thot the
C .t > has collected $98.000 by its impact fee.
1\h1ch sum the CJty has allocated for capita!

1mprn\ ements 1n the following areas electric.JI ~Oo;>, :.ewage treatment plJ.nt expansion.
fi00--0 . .HHJ water. 20 010
But these alloc..it1ons
1 >urnc> now expended and some" not) do nae

, ·:-.-., case w;;i.s disJ. reasonable
'•1irge for a specif11.. ~.:1~.'11..•: ;.., permissible,
'hPrea.s a general fee ~'.\, 1.t amounts to a
re~·enue measure 1s ;iot
Home Builders
...\.ssoc1ation of Greater >.~it Lake, 28 Utah
2d at -104, .503 P.2d at -1.5~ We reaffirm
that distinction, and agrl:e with the district
court's conclusion that the impact fee deposited in the City's general revenues 1n
this case is an illegal t.ax. 1 Weber Ba.sin
Home Butlders Associati'on v. Roy City, SU·
pro The partial summary judgment the
City has challenged by its app€al in :-lo.
17534 is therefore affirmeJ.
T

:12r

Basin Home

B~,

• :~141-.J 1shed nn the bet51::. tr.it

II CONNECTION FEES
[4] The district court denied plointiff's
motion for summary Judgment on the alleged facial invalidity of the various connection fees, and· put plaintiff to trial on the
reasonableness of those fees. ~hat was the
correct procedure. Banberry Development
Corp. v_ South Jordan City, supra; Home
Builders Associat1on of Greater Salt Lake v.
Provo City, supra.
Al the conclusion of tnal, the court made
findings on the per-unit cost of the three
services. In each case, the per-unit costs
were substantially in excess of the amount
of the connection fees. The court therefore
concluded that the connection fees were
valid because they were ''reasonable and
represent the cost of creating, maintaining
and using the aforesaid utilities." In No.
17S36, plaintiff appeals from that decree_
Six T!'lonths after the

~is~~ct

cn !rt's rlc1

t \.3.::,ih·'d JtS ;ot."\j(\'' ;• .-:,,
berrj Development Corp. i-. South Jorrl:w
City, supra, which involved water connec-

!'r

I'~•

I

tion fees and park improvement fees. In
that case, we outlined ''the constitutional
standards of reasonableness," 631 P.2d .1t
903, that govern the validity of connection
Jller our conclusion The validity of a fee imposed to augment generu! re\'enues is dererrruned by its legal st;ltus at the time 1t is exact·
ed. without regard to how the funds are later
allocated or spent. This 1s not a case !1ke those
invoh:ing conne<:t1on fees. where the ordinances imposing the fees d1:>s1gnated the col\ec·
oons for specific uses

LAFFERTY v. PA 1 '' 1-.;
Cite- as, Ulllh. 64:! P 20

fees charged by mun;21oa:ities. Plaintiff
contends that this Jec:-ee mlbt be vaco.te<l
and the case remandi::d for reconsideration
tn light of Banberry becau<>e the district

court's decision that the t.hr~e conn~tion
fees were reasonable -.va.s based on only
part of the factors this Court subsequently
outlined in Banberry. We agree.

[5] The Hanberry opinion identifies seven important factors that should be considered "in determining the relative burden
already borne and yet to be borne by newly
developed properties and other properties
" 631 P.2d at 903-4. In brief, those
factors are (1) the cost of existing capital
facilities; (2) the rnea:is by which those
facilities have been financed; (3) the extent
to which the properties being charged the
new fees have already contributed to the
cost of the existing facilities; (4) the ext~nt
to which they will contribute to the cost of
existing capital facilities in the future; (5)
the extent to which they should be creditcrl
for providing common facilities that the
municipality has provided without charge to
other properties in its service area; (6) extraordinary costs, if any, in serving the new
property; and (7) the time-price rlifferentia\
inherent in fair comparisons of amounts
paid at different limes. 631 P.2<l at 904.
[6] The objective of the complicated
comparison in Banberry is to J.Ssure that
municipal fees pertaining to newly developed properties do not require them to bear
more than their equitablt. share of the capit:.1 M"t::: rin COr""'.f'1.ris0ri wit~ 0t\.ie:- pro;i.::~'"''l...:.~·d'1

"··' :._tGi:::f: ...:.

":.t;!n·,-.. j

<•

1TY

~71;

[71 T''~·-· 1'
that ·i-:e
construc~1 ·n ''1 ·he ~en1C':' arf':J.S
·1
Thu:.,, ~he t>-.:pert e':1dence •)n the J'"',·
of WcJ.ter a:-:d sewer service~ was ~11-'-"·1 n
the ;979 cost .J[ -:onstructin~ the ~\pan,1,1n
facilities r.eeded in those areas. Th.ic :'1t: '.sure Joes not .1ch1eve the equitable ail' c.:it1on
sought 1n B.lnberry, since 1t fixes the :1t1re
cost of new facilities on ne'.vly de\ t."•'t"-'l
properties without assurance that these
costs are equ:t.J.ble in re!ation to benefits
conferred and in compan::.on with costs il""1posed on other property owners in the municipality. For example, if the costs .:,f
maintenance and repayment of bonded indebtedness for construction of the existing
system are being financed by general tax
revenues, service fees, or other payments
collected from the entire municipality-including the newly constructed homes-the
new homes will be burdened witb all of the
capital costs of expanding the service capacity plus a portion of the costs of the existing one. In an effort to avoid this kind of
unfairness, the seven factors in Hanberry
require a different approach than imposingatl costs of expansion of capacity on the
newly developed properties

(8) The exµert evidence 0:1 the unit cost
of electrical services w~ ha.sed on the replacement cost in 1979 of the mumcipa!ity's
ex1stlng e!ectncal system. If apµropnale!y
discounted for the age a.nrl condition uf the
existing system, that measure would satisfy
one of the factors in B:inberry, but woulJ
\'>':' ::"\("1)~.:•lf->'·· ·vitfinq~ :nnu·:· .,.,, '.~'>' n•;-..

1_.

proµerly applied, tho:::.e seven factors should
put the new homeowner on essentially the
same basis as the average exi:1ting homeowner with respect to costs borne in the
past and to be borne in the future, in comparison with benefits already received and
yet to be received. The mumcipa!itv has
the burden of disclosing the hasis ~f its
calculations to whoever challenge::: the reasonahleness of the fees, and its allocations
need not achieve precise mathematical
equality. Banbcrry, 631 P.2d at 904

\\ a.s financed. This I:'.) necessary, for ex.:i.mple, to assure that a property owner involved in a new home dc\·e!oµment 1s not
r~quired to buy lnto the capital \a.Jue ,;f
existing mumc1pal sen·1ces and then pay '.or
some portion of the same c:ip1t3.l \'alue a
second time by future tax paymrnts ag:t1n;,t
the bonded indebtedness usL·rl t\' L·nn::.truc~
them ongrn:.dly
Since nnt

J.11 uf the f:tctn1·::.

~ct "Ut 'n ·~h

Cuurt's intervl'.ning np1n1nn .n H.1.';/•(·;;_1
velupment C.irp
:·;;011rh I()rri:ll'

lle-
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"'.~,.,,_,

-1':' . r,:1:.:

·ne •1.::.Cr'\'
remanr1 !',,r

·he taking

.i,r'

mun1Llj>J.I

iet.S.

·:::i.c::i.te '.h~ decree

:n •.:.a.se \"u

it'

17.536 ,1n,J

.r';~~r ;)r0Cet'd1n~ i1ncluu111<;

i:· ... 1,J1t:<Jnal

,aryJ con::-1~~t:'lt

.~·1th

evidence, 1f neces-

Banberry and

N1th

this opinion

So 0rr/t:r("'J

cvsts

.Each party to bear own

HALL, C .J. anJ STEWART. HOWE and

DCRHA:I!, JJ, concur.

In J.Jrnducts liabtl1t:r at.:t.••
rifle. error, :f :.n, .1

.ng

··'<Pi·Jo11n~

,1dm1::i.-,1on uf expert ·.l ~·_1n1··

"• 0::'1:1ng

J.nalysis of s·~:--.
1 r.-,1 --<:~111 ,f: ·'•as
not pn~Jud1..::1al where -=:·: clE:r.,e trom •Jther
·,v1tne~es concerning purc"·'-~o:::r s use of gun
powder (Jf type not recommenJed fur rifle
;;uµported judgment for m~111_.,{J.cturer
•''lt:~ll(';jj

1

.\'1. David Eckersley, Sait Lc1.ke City, for
plaintiff ::inrl appellant.
Craig S. Cook, Max D. \Vhee!er. J Anther
ny E)Te, Sa1t Lake City, for defendants and
respondents.
HALL. Chief J ust1ce·

~lichael

David DOWLAND. Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.

LDIAN PRODUCTS FOR SHOOTERS. a

cor-poration, Euroarms, The Uisure
Group, Inc.. and ABC corporations 1
through 10, Defendants and Respondents.

No. 17323.
Supreme Court of C'tah.

Feb. 23. 1982.

. ...,

I

Products liahdity ~ction was brou!!ht
c1 nri._.
~1 '.:1 .... :..:.L·tcirc..
rJ!::- ~1.~

,1~,t

,·hd.-,er. The I nint D1stnct Crnrt, Sa1t l...J.he
County, Peter F Lear:, J, entered judgment for the manufacturer, and purchaser
appealed The Supreme Court, Ha!l, C J,
helrl that error, if any, in tnal court's adm1ss11)n of expert testimony concerning
chemical analysis of gun barrel residue was
nut preJ udu..:1-<I .,,.. here e\ idence from other
witnc:,ses concerning purchaser's use of gun
p<,1.,..der ,if type ~wt recommended fur rifle
'>Uppnrt<>d JUd){mPnt ior manuf..icturer.

Affirmed

Plaintiff brought this action against Lyman Products for Shooters, a fireann distnbu ting company, and its parent company,
The Leisure Group, Inc., on a strict product
1iab1ltty theory. Following' a Spei:1al jury
verdict in favor of defendants, the trial
court rendered a Judgment of no cause of
action Plaintiff appeab on the ground of
improper admiss1un of expert ·e::;t1mony by
the tnaJ court..
Plaintiff purchased a rifle distributed by
Lyman Products in the summer of 1916 and
fired 1t approximately 50 to 75 times without incident. On September 15, 1976, as
plarntiff fire<l the rifle. it exploded in the
area of the breech, injuring his wrist and
hand. Plaintiff claims that the explo::>ion
was caused by a defect ln the de~ign
the
rifle .vhich. hv 1ncorp0ratmg- a "dovetail"

or

.u:,

l

·~,

b.,r;c 1

n_r.rl.-·r·~d ~l

\\O:~\!(

µrt.s::.u.re of t.:xµluJtn~ ;.,nJ11
powrler Plaintiff testified that he hJ.d always loaded the weapon with blat:k powder,
as recommended by the manufacturer, and
that he had followed prorer procedures in
handling and firing it.
~o .~'iLll.:.land clle

Defendants claim that plaintiff's rifle
was Jesigned safely and that it could not
have exploded under the pressure created
b~ black powder.
Defendants introrlucerl
evidence to show that plaintiff had actually
!oJ.ded the rifle with :)mokeless powder,

PATTE"'ON v ALP!:'ffi CITY
Cite

i:;
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1. Municipal Corp .. rations J=>712

Wayne )!. PATTERSON, Plai"r;ff
and Respondent,

ALPINE CITY.- a :'llunicipal

Cor~oration,

Defendant and Appellant_

April 21, 1983.
City app€aled from summary judgment
rendered by the Fourth D1stnct Court,
Utah County, J. P.obert Bullock, J., declaring sewer connection fee invalid. The Su·
preme Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) sewer
connection fee a3.3essed by city was not
established as required by law and was,
therefore, invalid where city had not by
resolut10n or ordinance in writing establisherl the sewer connection fee, and (2) if
sewer connection fee was to be used to
retire bonded indebtedness, all users in the
system had to be treated equally, and latecomers could not be subjected to arbitrary
increase whereby fee of $100 in first month
was increased to $1,000 in second month
an<l $1,500 in third month, which was not

required to cover increased costs,' but was

done to induce e·arly purchase of required
540 connections to raise sum required to be
deposited before funding was approved by
appropriate federal agencies.

A!firT'1eri

~lunicipal

2.

~unicipal

Corporations ""'106(1)
Langu..ige of statute requiring that all
resolut:un3 of municipal governments shall
be in writing is mandatory. U.C ..-1._1953,
10-J-506.
Corporations

10-8-J8.

4. Municipal Corporations =-712

No. 18114.
Supreme Court of Utah.

l.

~1umc1pa!itit:s r.12.J' mJ.ke a reasonable
charge for the use of a ~ewer 3ystem in
order that 1t be :i~il-su:>t.a1mng, but no
greater charge is ou'.1ior1ze<L U.C.A.1953,

~i12

se .. i,,·er connectwn fee a.ssessed hy city
\VJ..j n•)t e;,t.tbJ15hed J..S re-qu1reJ hy )aw and
was, therefore. 1nvaiiJ where city had not

bv re':!olution or ordinan<.'e in wnting estab1i~hed t_hi= si=·Ner conne<:t10n fee
UC A
195:J, 10-;J-,j06, ll'-.1-717

If sewer connectiun fee was to be used
to rellre bonded ;ndebtedness, all user.s in
the system had to be treated equally, and
latecomers could not be subjected to arbitrary increase whereby fee of $700 in fint
month was increased to $1,000, in second
month and $1,500 in third month, which was
not required to cover increased costs, but
was done to induce early purchase of req uirL-d 540 connections to raise sum required -to be dep<>sited before funding was
approved by appropnate federal agencies.
U.C.A.1953, 10-8--38.

John C. Backlund, Provo, for defendant
and appellant.
Ray M. Harding, Pleasant Grove, for
plaintiff and resp<>ndenL
HOWE, Justice:
Defendant Alpine City appeals from a
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff
declaring a sewer connection fee invalid.
In 1976 Alpine City joined with American
Fork, Lehi and Pleasant Grov• in establish!:115 :he :· modnOl(O~ Sprl:al Scrvit.:~ Distrct
to aea~ a "'.l.:lte ·.va~er ~rt!atmenc. fac1ltty
sernng the named cities.
1977, after
obtaining various loans and grants, Alpine
City had to deposit the sum of $375,000
before funding wa.s approved by the appropriate federal agencies. Alpine City estimated that with a projected hookup of 540
9ewer connections, the initial price per con·
nection would be $700

rn

In 1978 A!p1r:e City enacted an ordinance
which provuJed that a fee for con~ection to
the city sewer system could be fixe<l from
time to time by resolut10n of the city coun·
APPENDIX
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cil. Thereafter, without ·.vr1tten resolution,
Alpine City established a pl-'1n to sell ;:.~wer
connection permits for the 1rnt1al ~nee of
$700. To induce early purchase of the required number (540) of sewer connections to
raise the $375,000, Alpine advised the public
that the fee would be increased after one
month to $1,000, and after two months to
$1,500. Anyone could purchase the permits
at $700 for subsequent resale to potential
builders or homeowners.

In December. of 1979 plaintiif purchased
his sewer connection permit under protest
for the price of .$1,500 and brought this
action to ·have that fee declared void and
unenforceable, and to permanently enjoin
Alpine City -from assessing the fee. On
motion for summary judgment brought by
the plaintiff, the court below entered a
partial summary judgment in favor of
plaintiff ruling (l) that the fee was illegally
assessed against the plaintiff because no
written resolution had been adopted by the
city council before December of 1979, and
(2) that the plan was ultra vires under
Alpines statutory authority. The court left
for triaf the issue of whether plaintiff was
entitled to a refund of the full amount of
$1,500. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the remaining issue was dismi55ed and
an order making the partial summary judgment final was entered.
Alpine City appeals, contending that summary judgment was not proper and that the
sewer connection fee plan adopted by it was
a valid e'<:ercise of its general police powers.
(1, 2) We now addreSd the two points of
law on which the lower- court found for
plaintiff in order to determine whether
summary judgment was proper. Under
U.C.A., 1953, § 11}-3-717, (Supp.1981) as
enacted in 1977, all municipal governments
"may exercise all administrative powers by
resolution including, but not limited to: (1)
Establishing water and sewer rates; ·
"
Section ll}-3-506, enacted the same year,
provides as follows:
A roll call vote shall be taken and recorded for all ordinances, resolutions, and any
action which would create a liability
against the municipality and in any other

case at the req ...... :-.:
governing r.!Jd} u:

·::es" )f 1 "no" •;nte
Every resolution
or ordinance o;ha!I ',e in wnting before
the vote 1s taken.
and shail be

.J.

:H<,,.~ed

Alpine City admitted in its response to
plaintiff's req·Jest for production of document:; that "[p]rior to December 1979. defendant had not by resolution or ordinance
in writing established a sewer connection
fee for connection to the Alpine system."
The language of the above statute requiring that all resolutions shall be in writing is
mandatory. The trial court thus did not err
in concluding that the sewer connection fee
was not established as required by law and
therefore invalid.
Cities and towns are empowered to
charge for the use of their sewer systems
by § 10--8-38. That· statute provide• in
pertinent part:
Any city or town may, for the purpose of
defraying the cost of construction, reconstruction, maintenance or operation of
any sewer system or sewage treatment
plant, proVide for mandatory hookup
where the sewer is available and· within
300 feet of any property line with any
building used for human occupancy and
make a reasonable charge for the use
thereof. [Emphasis added.]
·

(3] The scope of power granted by the
Legislature under this statute is clear. ~fu
nicipahties may make a reasonable charge ·
for the use of a sewer system in order tha.~-~""';~
1
it be ;.,>lf-':lu.:::.ta1ning Hume 3uiirlers .-:Ll.s'n_ .:-:v. Pr''"' City, 2:l Ct:ih 2d .\U:!. 503 P.2d:.i<iL·.':.
(1972); Banberry Dev. Cof'J" v. South Jar- ·
dan. Utah, 631 P.2d 899 (1981). Lafferty v.
Payson City, Utah, 642 P.2d 376 (1982). ~o
greater charge is authorized_ We do not
purport to know whether $700, $1,000 or
$1,500, or none of those amounts, 1s in fact
a reasonable charge to con::itruct, maintain
and operate Alpine's ~ystem. But a!\ three
amounts obviously cannot be rea.'«Jnab!e
within a two month penod.

(4] Alpine City
v1/le, Ctah, 610 P 2<l
its contention· that
proper. That case

cites Rupp v. Crants338 (19~01 '" ouprxirt of
the rate incre:J..::ie was
is readily d1st1ngui::)ha·

DESCHLER

v.

F!RS."IAN'S FUND A..\IERICAN LffE INS.
Cit.- j~ 66J P2d

Th,...,. 0 1n originJ.! charge rd ~2:SO ior
t!dC.'; r•:-,,,j':'r,,,e connected to the S! S~Cm W<i.'.)
rabed- :.v '",!;() when it was founrl ~nat the
citv had :·dtled to include the µrice for 18.006 :inear :·eet of necessary se•,>,.tr laterals.
The affected users re<;etved letkr'S explaining the mistake, advertisements \vere run,
and a public meeting was held. F•illowmg
open di3cussion, the increase was voted
upon and approved. Alpine City, on the
other hand, does not contend that its subse·
quent increases in the connection fee were
required to cover increased costs, but con·
cedes that they were made to induce early
purchase of the required 540 connections.
In so doing, Alpine did not uniformly treat ·
all users.

n
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11 E. McQuillin. The Law of Municipal
Corporations § 3L30a (3d ed. 1982) states
that "[t]he charges imposed for using oc for
making connection with municipal sewers
mu.5t be reasonable, not arbitrary, and uniform, not discriminatory." See also 3 Yokley. Municipal Corporations § 503 (1958),
stating that "[t]he rates for municipally
owned utilities, such as a sanitary sewer
system, must be uniformly applied, or the
entire rate structure will be set aside."
Alpine maintains that the "increases were
required to enable the city to repay its
bonded indebtedness on the project and its
share of the bonded indebtedn""5 of the
Timpanogos SP'>Cial Service District, the regional agency providing sewer treatment
facilities." If the connection fee is indeed
to be used to retire bonded indebtedness,
then all L!Sers On the system must be treatv...'. equally and iare-comen cannot be ::rnl">Jt:<.:led to .in arbitrary inaea.se of over lUOO',,.
in a period of two months. See Weber
Basin Home Builders' A.ss'n. v. Roy City, 26
l'lah 2d 215, 487 P2ct 866 (1971).
The ,ummary judgment granted below is
affirmed basts to respondenL
HALL, C.J . and STEW ART, OAKS and
DURHA:I[. JJ .. concur.

Elizabeth A. DEoiCHLER. Plaintiff
and He!:!pondent.
FIRDIAN'S FUND AMERICAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Appe!lanL·
No. 18035.
Supreme Court oi Utah.
April '27, !983.

Action was brought to recover benefits
under accidental death-policy. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal
Taylor, J., rendered summary judgment for
beneficiary, and insurer appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that waterski kite was a "device for-aerial navigation"
within meaning of exclusionary clause.
Reversed.
Howe, J., filed dissenting opinion in
which Stewart, J.. joined.

Insurance "=438.l
Considering aerodynam_ic principles
which affect ability to become and remain
airborne and limited degree of operator
control over direction, speed, and timing
and place of landing, a waterski kite is a
"device for aeria.I navigation" within mean·
ing ()f exclusion c!au~ of life policy
St:"e publication '.Vcrds Jnd Phrases
for other jud.JciaJ construcuom and
definitions.

Elliott J. Williams, Bruce H. Jensen, Salt
Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
Henry S. Nygaard, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and respondent
DURHAM, Justice:
The respondent filed suit below to r""over insurance benefit.9 under an accidental

,
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ROBE~T J.
:lEBR't " ASsc,:I/\TES
Attorney !or ?laintl ! f
1965 East "800 Sout.I) t2
Sal':. LaJc.a City, Utah
341~7
1Telepnone1 (90ll 262-39LS
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:or S.inctions
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...,as heard on i\uc;ust G.

1992.

Pl.Ji.ntit'fs were

(July 29, 1982)

repres~nted

by

Def, •1dunt was

rcpres~nted

the

of counsel, it is hereby ordered

~rguments

by Stephen Homer.

that:

l.

The trial is hereby bifurcated int.o two phases.

2.

Ae the first phaae, defendant shall have t.he burden

ot ?reducing evidence on the followi.nq i.ssuesi
Defendant to provide an accountinq of the truat fWld~

~.

pald to defendant in the form of a 7\ 9ubdivid.er'a fee.

accounting 9hould,

~ ~.

Th•

sµcci fy how defend&nt has 1pent

the 7\ subdivis.Lon fL.:cs paid by i-:iL1lnt1ffs.

The accountinq ahall

also compare how de fend.int has spent the 7\ fees received from tho.

other subdivisions 1.1.st.cJ. in Ocfcnd.1nt's Response to Oi1covery
'dated May 26, 1982, CJll v. Clty _u1
I Ut.

'...-est Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 220

19 79 I .
!3.

rel.1.cs

':O
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.J.ssurc Lh.1t Lh·· 7\

.reasonableness.
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other amount)
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,,

Lil...: calculations upon which it
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.ire

Th.Ls sh.111, ~ ~.

rclLcs to sho.., that 7\

lS a rc-.1sonable amount.

':.he -:Jta upon which l! ... ~ ... ndant rel.io.,;os

include the data upon

(as opposed to 10\ or 90Dle

Thia •hall further
tci
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RCBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATFS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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Telephone:
(801) 262-8915
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOHN CALL and CLARK JENKINS,

MOTION TO FILE ADDENDUM
TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
CITY OF WEST JORDAN,

No. 19186

Defendants and Respondents.)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)

This
rules.

case

was

briefed

under

the

old

appellate

The new appellate rules require relevant documents

to be reproduced in an addendum (Rule 24f).
Although the addendum was not required at the time
briefs

were

filed

in

this

assistance to the Court.
the Court a

case,

an

addendum

may

be

of

Furthermore, an addendum may save

substantial amount of time

in researching the

record.
The proposed Addendum (attached hereto) relates to
Appellant's Reply Brief, page 5,

footnote 1.

Specifically,

the addendum constitutes the Master Plan of West Jordan.
6~3,

R

et seq.)
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Thus
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the

only

any

agenda
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of

or
the

content of the meeting is the Master Plan itself.
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